[Sidenote:  Map, p. 292.]

While these events were occurring in Lord Roberts’ rear, he was advancing eastwards from Pretoria.  The battle of Diamond Hill was followed by a brief period of quietude in the east as well as the west.  The objective of the British Army was the railway from Pretoria to Komati Poort, on which the Transvaal Government, covered by Botha at Balmoral, was now dwelling at Machadodorp.  The movements of Lord Roberts were for some time controlled by the situation in the Free State and the Western Transvaal, which called more pressingly for attention than the eastward advance.

Early in July a column under Hutton was sent out to feel towards Botha’s left.  As he was opposed and made little progress, Lord Roberts a few days later reinforced him with French and a cavalry brigade, and on July 11 the combined columns thrust back the Boers from their positions at Witpoort, a few miles south of Diamond Hill.  Botha had arranged with the commandants on the other side of Pretoria for concurrent attacks on the British forces in the vicinity of the capital, and his own was the only operation that was foiled on July 11.  French’s success, however, could not be followed up.  He proposed to raid the railway near Balmoral, but Lord Roberts had been made anxious for the safety of Pretoria by the news of the affairs of Zilikat’s Nek and Onderste Poort, and recalled him.  Hutton was ordered to remain where he was, about twenty-five miles south-east of the capital, with a reduced force.

There were indications that an attack not only on Pretoria but also on Johannesburg was contemplated by the enemy, in collusion with plots for risings against the British which were hatching in each city.  It was no time yet for an eastward advance.  The successes north and west of Pretoria stimulated Botha to attack what he supposed would strategically now be the most vulnerable section of the perimeter of defence, namely, the section facing him.  If it had not been weakened by the withdrawal of troops to the west, troops would probably have been withdrawn from the west to meet him, and the task of Delarey thereby lightened.  Either alternative would forward his policy.

[Sidenote:  Map, p. 240.]

East of Pretoria Pole-Carew with the XIth Division was in touch with Hutton.  Botha recalled Grobler of Waterberg from the north, and on July 16 threw himself upon Pole-Carew and Hutton, near Witpoort.  The brunt of the attack fell upon the latter, who, though at first pressed back and outflanked on his right, recovered himself and forced the enemy to retire.  His immediate opponent was B. Viljoen, a leader who showed great military capacity in his management of the action.  Against the XIth Division Botha demonstrated only.  The chief incident of the affair was the holding of an outflanked and commanded kopje position by a few companies of the Royal Irish Fusiliers for six hours.

The scheme for the eastward advance, which Lord Roberts did not feel himself justified in initiating until after the affair of July 16, was that French should rejoin Hutton and take charge of the right; with Ian Hamilton, brought down from his northward demonstration against Grobler, on the extreme left north of the railway, while Pole-Carew advanced with Lord Roberts centrally along it.