It was evident to Lord Roberts that things had taken a serious turn, and that his position in the Transvaal was unsound.  In framing his plans for the advance from Bloemfontein, he had naturally expected that the Natal railway would be available as an alternative line of communication soon after he entered the Transvaal; but the movements of Buller were deliberate, and nearly a third of it was still in the enemy’s hands.  It is probable that Lord Roberts would have been less disinclined to the “steam-rollering” policy if he could have foreseen that on the day he entered Pretoria the Natal Army would be still south of Laing’s Nek.

As a preliminary measure pending, the elaboration of a definite scheme to put the Free State in order, Kitchener, who was always held in readiness with steam up to proceed to districts in difficulties and hustle local commandants and their staffs, was sent across the Vaal with a column; and Methuen’s Division was set in motion.

On the Bloemfontein side, Kelly-Kenny took temporary charge of all the troops south of Kroonstad, whither a brigade under C. Knox was sent to protect the stores and supplies; and Winburg was strengthened.  While C. De Wet was engaged upon his own work his brother P. De Wet, whom he threatened to shoot if he gave in, was discussing terms of surrender with Methuen at Lindley, but as in the contemporaneous negotiations between C. Botha and Buller at Laing’s Nek, and between L. Botha and Lord Roberts in the Transvaal, no terms of settlement were arranged; and Methuen quitted a pacificatory colloquy with one brother to encounter the other in arms, and joined Kitchener at Heilbron Road Station on June 10.

De Wet was elbowed away westwards from the railway, but he soon circled back, recrossing it at Lieuw Spruit between Rhenoster River Bridge and Heilbron Road Station, where he not only took fifty prisoners, but almost captured Kitchener, who chanced to be passing through at the time.

It is interesting to speculate briefly on the effect which such a notable capture might have had upon the general situation.  The Boers themselves would hardly have realized its importance.  They were unaware of the position held by Kitchener in the British Army, and his name was unfamiliar to them.  He had been here and there like many another commander whom they had met in the field.  Still, they had never yet captured an unwounded general officer, and they would no doubt have made a great effort to prevent his services being again available against them.[47] It is, however, unlikely that De Wet would have been able to retain his prisoner for more than a few weeks at most.  But no one can say what De Wet could not do.  At home it is probable that a disastrous reaction would have followed the news of the railway broken, of Lord Roberts insolated in the Transvaal, and of Lord Kitchener of Khartoum a prisoner of war and possibly a hostage.  It is very doubtful whether the nation, entangled by fresh difficulties and deafened by pro-Boer yells growing shriller and shriller every hour, would have remained firm of purpose.  It is hardly too much to say that June 12, 1900, was one of the most critical dates in the history of the war.