Nearly 500 yeomen were added to the panel of British prisoners of war by the hawk-like swoop of De Wet and the brothers Prinsloo almost under the eyes of three Divisions of the British Army.  For not only were Colvile and Rundle aware of Spragge’s predicament, but as soon as it was reported to Lord Roberts, Methuen was ordered to the rescue.

Methuen, who only arrived at Kroonstad from the west on May 28, was already on the move to help Colvile, from whom a disquieting message had been received at Head Quarters.  Colvile’s safe arrival at Heilbron next day rendered assistance unnecessary, and Methuen, under instructions from Lord Roberts, turned towards Lindley.  He was, however, too late, for as he approached the town the news of Spragge’s surrender reached him on June 1.  He ran into the rear of the Boers hurrying away with their prey, and even intercepted two guns and some wagons, but was unable to retain them.

The Lindley affair sent Colvile back to England in the wake of Gatacre.  The responsibility of the surrender was fixed upon him and he was deprived of his command.  He had no doubt been in a false position during the first fortnight of the advance from Bloemfontein when he was kept trailing behind a junior officer, and this slight perhaps affected his judgment, but he was constitutionally incapable of viewing a situation synoptically and perspectively.  As at Sannah’s Post, so again at Lindley the halation of a word or two in his orders fogged the image on his retina.  He doggedly stared at the words Heilbron, May 29, as if the whole issue of the campaign depended upon them.  There was nothing in the context to show that they were more than the details of an itinerary which he was expected to follow if circumstances permitted.  He was urgently in need of the very mounted troops with which he made no effort to put himself in touch. Bis peccare in bello non licet.  Lord Roberts could forgive once, but Colvile was superseded for having twice shown a “want of military capacity and initiative."[44]

Yet the disaster was not due to his default alone, although the contributory defaults of others were rightly not permitted to excuse him.  He had good reason to think that a well-mounted force would be able to take care of itself, and to believe that proper staff arrangements had been made for Spragge’s march; but in each of these warrantable assumptions he was wrong.  Lindley was the first of a series of disasters which seemed to show that Lord Roberts had pushed on too hastily.

Rundle’s endeavour to help Spragge by a demonstration in the direction of Bethlehem soon came to an end.  It is said that a telegram in which he announced the movement to Brabant fell into the hands of the Boers, who promptly utilized the information.  On May 29 he was seriously checked at the Biddulphsberg, where they had taken up a position.  He failed in an attack on what he believed was the Boers’ flank but which was in reality their front.  During the engagement he received a telegram from Head Quarters, dated three days previously, ordering him to join Brabant in the Ficksburg district, and he withdrew from the action, having suffered 186 casualties, some of which were caused by a fire which broke out in the long grass through which he had advanced, and in which helpless wounded men were lying.  A brigade of Tucker’s Division under Clements took his place at Senekal.