At midday, Spragge reconnoitred the town, and finding it occupied, withdrew to a position outside.  Although Colvile had quitted it but a few hours previously, and although the dust of his column could still be seen on the Heilbron road, a commando under Michael Prinsloo, which he had driven out, had promptly returned; and some burghers who had surrendered to Spragge on May 26, and who, having given up their rifles, had been “allowed to return to their farms,” went to Lindley instead and gave warning of the approach of the Yeomanry.

Spragge counted on being able to draw rations at Lindley when he joined Colvile, and marched out of Kroonstad with two days’ rations only, and these, although eked out by a capture of sheep on the way, were almost exhausted.  There were three courses open to him:  to retire to Kroonstad, to follow Colvile, or to remain where he was.  He chose the last.

He took up, and did his best to make defensible, a plateau and kopje position two miles N.W. of the town.  He had 500 men, but no guns, and he reported the situation to Colvile, who was eighteen miles away when he received the message next morning; and to Rundle, who was at Senekal.  Colvile answered his appeal for assistance with a refusal, but suggested a retirement on Kroonstad; but the message did not reach Spragge.  Rundle was too far away to help Spragge directly, but made a movement towards Bethlehem, which he hoped would draw the enemy away from Lindley.

On May 28 the Boers took up positions which practically surrounded Spragge, but he held his own that day and the next; and although the enemy was reinforced on the 29th, he was not so closely invested that he could not have broken out.  Firing was heard in the S.E., and Spragge, believing that it was Rundle in action, endeavoured without success to communicate with him.

So long as the investing force was without guns, Spragge was confident of being able to hold on.  But on May 30 a further reinforcement came in.  Martin Prinsloo joined his brother with three guns and a strong commando.  The Prinsloos, who were acting under the orders of De Wet, had originally been detailed to look after Colvile, but were drawn away by the attraction of an easier prey at Lindley.

On May 30 a kopje on the west, from which the Boers were sniping into the position, was captured by Spragge, but soon fell again into the hands of the burghers.  It was recovered next morning, but pressure elsewhere squeezed it finally out of the grasp of the re-captors.  The Boers had brought their guns into action.  The key of Spragge’s position was two kopjes on the S.E. of the defence.  The outer kopje was rushed by the enemy, the detachment occupying it being driven back towards the inner kopje.  A panic-stricken non-commissioned officer in the connecting post between them raised the white flag without authority, and, it is said, was immediately shot for having done so.  The officer in command on the inner kopje considered that he was bound by the act and recognized it, and only hastened the inevitable end.  There was a last wriggle or two, and then Spragge, who was surrounded by 2,000 Boers with artillery, gave in.