Cronje, though urged to break out of his laager on the night of February 17, refused to move.  It is probable that he might have effected his escape if he had abandoned his transport.  An active force led by a determined man could have wriggled out under cover of the night, and joined one or other of the commandos which were known to be hovering.  Cronje was in communication with Ferreira; he had sent to Bloemfontein for help; and De Wet was known to be on his way from Koffyfontein.  But instead of making an effort to save himself he fatally trusted to relief from outside.  He did not realize that Vendutie Drift was not a Magersfontein which he could hold indefinitely, or that during the last few weeks the British Army had been greatly increased.  One result of his obstinacy was the desertion of several hundred Free Staters, who had not served very willingly under the leadership of a Transvaaler.  Most of them returned to their homes.

In the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, who was detained at Jacobsdaal by illness, Kelly-Kenny was the senior officer present with the force on the Modder River; but for some reason which may have formed itself in Lord Roberts’ mind when they were fellow-passengers on the Dunottar Castle, he was not entrusted with the management of the battle.  Kitchener had marched several hours with the VIth Division on February 14 before Kelly-Kenny was aware of his presence; and as Chief of the Staff in direct communication with Head Quarters, he had much to say at Klip Drift.  At Paardeberg the status of Kelly-Kenny became still more anomalous, Kitchener, though junior not only to him but also to two other generals present, being empowered by Lord Roberts to issue orders in his name so that there might be “no delay such as references to and fro would entail.”  The difficulty of the situation was increased by the fact that Kitchener was practically without a staff.

The reason which induced Cronje to remain in his laager, namely the expected arrival of help from outside, also determined Kitchener to attack it without delay.  He confidently expected to carry it in less than four hours, but Cronje held out for nine days.

Kitchener’s plan might have been foreseen by any officer who had been present at manoeuvres:  a preliminary bombardment of the laager, followed by a holding frontal attack, in combination with rolling-up flank attacks.  The strength of Cronje’s position was supposed to be the laager itself, whereas it was rather the river banks and tributary dongas which he had occupied.

The frontal display was assigned to a portion of the VIth Division; the Mounted Infantry under Hannay supported by an infantry brigade were to work round upstream and fall upon Cronje’s left flank; while the IXth Division attacked his right flank from the west.