To secure a real army, the officer should be first and last in the eye of the soldier,—­first and last in his attention, observance, and esteem.  Officers, it seems, there are to be, whose chief qualification must be temper and patience.  They are to manage their troops by electioneering arts.  They must bear themselves as candidates, not as commanders.  But as by such means power may be occasionally in their hands, the authority by which they are to be nominated becomes of high importance.

What you may do finally does not appear:  nor is it of much moment, whilst the strange and contradictory relation between your army and all the parts of your republic, as well as the puzzled relation of those parts to each other and to the whole, remain as they are.  You seem to have given the provisional nomination of the officers, in the first instance, to the king, with a reserve of approbation by the National Assembly.  Men who have an interest to pursue are extremely sagacious in discovering the true seat of power.  They must soon perceive that those who can negative indefinitely in reality appoint.  The officers must therefore look to their intrigues in the Assembly as the sole certain road to promotion.  Still, however, by your new Constitution, they must begin their solicitation at court.  This double negotiation for military rank seems to me a contrivance, as well adapted as if it were studied for no other end, to promote faction in the Assembly itself relative to this vast military patronage,—­and then to poison the corps of officers with factions of a nature still more dangerous to the safety of government, upon any bottom on which it can be placed, and destructive in the end to the efficacy of the army itself.  Those officers who lose the promotions intended for them by the crown must become of a faction opposite to that of the Assembly which has rejected their claims, and must nourish discontents in the heart of the army against the ruling powers.  Those officers, on the other hand, who, by carrying their point through an interest in the Assembly, feel themselves to be at best only second in the good-will of the crown, though first in that of the Assembly, must slight an authority which would not advance and could not retard their promotion.  If, to avoid these evils, you will have no other rule for command or promotion than seniority, you will have an army of formality; at the same time it will become more independent and more of a military republic.  Not they, but the king is the machine.  A king is not to be deposed by halves.  If he is not everything in the command of an army, he is nothing.  What is the effect of a power placed nominally at the head of the army, who to that army is no object of gratitude or of fear?  Such a cipher is not fit for the administration of an object of all things the most delicate, the supreme command of military men.  They must be constrained (and their inclinations lead them to what their necessities require) by a