View this new executive officer on the side of his political capacity, as he acts under the orders of the National Assembly.  To execute laws is a royal office; to execute orders is not to be a king.  However, a political executive magistracy, though merely such, is a great trust.  It is a trust, indeed, that has much depending upon its faithful and diligent performance, both in the person presiding in it and in all its subordinates.  Means of performing this duty ought to be given by regulation; and dispositions towards it ought to be infused by the circumstances attendant on the trust.  It ought to be environed with dignity, authority, and consideration, and it ought to lead to glory.  The office of execution is an office of exertion.  It is not from impotence we are to expect the tasks of power.  What sort of person is a king to command executory service, who has no means whatsoever to reward it:—­not in a permanent office; not in a grant of land; no, not in a pension of fifty pounds a year; not in the vainest and most trivial title?  In France the king is no more the fountain of honor than he is the fountain of justice.  All rewards, all distinctions, are in other hands.  Those who serve the king can be actuated by no natural motive but fear,—­by a fear of everything except their master.  His functions of internal coercion are as odious as those which he exercises in the department of justice.  If relief is to be given to any municipality, the Assembly gives it.  If troops are to be sent to reduce them to obedience to the Assembly, the king is to execute the order; and upon every occasion he is to be spattered over with the blood of his people.  He has no negative; yet his name and authority is used to enforce every harsh decree.  Nay, he must concur in the butchery of those who shall attempt to free him from his imprisonment, or show the slightest attachment to his person or to his ancient authority.

Executive magistracy ought to be constituted in such a manner that those who compose it should be disposed to love and to venerate those whom they are bound to obey.  A purposed neglect, or, what is worse, a literal, but perverse and malignant obedience, must be the ruin of the wisest counsels.  In vain will the law attempt to anticipate or to follow such studied neglects and fraudulent attentions.  To make them act zealously is not in the competence of law.  Kings, even such as are truly kings, may and ought to bear the freedom of subjects that are obnoxious to them.  They may, too, without derogating from themselves, bear even the authority of such persons, if it promotes their service.  Louis the Thirteenth mortally hated the Cardinal de Richelieu; but his support of that minister against his rivals was the source of all the glory of his reign, and the solid foundation of his throne itself.  Louis the Fourteenth, when come to the throne, did not love the Cardinal Mazarin; but for his interests he preserved him in power.  When old, he detested Louvois; but for years, whilst