affections in our families.  No cold relation is a zealous citizen.  We pass on to our neighborhoods, and our habitual provincial connections.  These are inns and resting-places.  Such divisions of our country as have been formed by habit, and not by a sudden jerk of authority, were so many little images of the great country, in which the heart found something which it could fill.  The love to the whole is not extinguished by this subordinate partiality.  Perhaps it is a sort of elemental training to those higher and more large regards by which alone men come to be affected, as with their own concern, in the prosperity of a kingdom so extensive as that of France.  In that general territory itself, as in the old name of Provinces, the citizens are interested from old prejudices and unreasoned habits, and not on account of the geometric properties of its figure.  The power and preeminence of Paris does certainly press down and hold these republics together as long as it lasts:  but, for the reasons I have already given you, I think it can not last very long.

Passing from the civil creating and the civil cementing principles of this Constitution to the National Assembly, which is to appear and act as sovereign, we see a body in its constitution with every possible power and no possible external control.  We see a body without fundamental laws, without established maxims, without respected rules of proceeding, which nothing can keep firm to any system whatsoever.  Their idea of their powers is always taken at the utmost stretch of legislative competency, and their examples for common cases from the exceptions of the most urgent necessity.  The future is to be in most respects like the present Assembly; but, by the mode of the new elections and the tendency of the new circulations, it will be purged of the small degree of internal control existing in a minority chosen originally from various interests, and preserving something of their spirit.  If possible, the next Assembly must be worse than the present.  The present, by destroying and altering everything, will leave to their successors apparently nothing popular to do.  They will be roused by emulation and example to enterprises the boldest and the most absurd.  To suppose such an Assembly sitting in perfect quietude is ridiculous.

Your all-sufficient legislators, in their hurry to do everything at once, have forgot one thing that seems essential, and which, I believe, never has been before, in the theory or the practice, omitted by any projector of a republic.  They have forgot to constitute a senate, or something of that nature and character.  Never, before this time, was heard of a body politic composed of one legislative and active assembly, and its executive officers, without such a council:  without something to which foreign states might connect themselves,—­something to which, in the ordinary detail of government, the people could look up,—­something which might give a bias and