and their allies ravaged the open country. “The
like had not been seen,” as the native scribe
observes, “even in the times of the kings of
Lower Egypt, when the plague (i.e. the Hyksos
power) was in the land, and the kings of Upper Egypt
were unable to drive it out.” Egypt was
desolated; its people “trembled like geese;”
the fertile lands were overrun and wasted; the cities
were pillaged; even the harbours were in some cases
ruined and destroyed. Menephthah for a time remained
on the defensive, shut up within the walls of Memphis,
whose god Phthah he viewed as his special protector.
He made, however, strenuous efforts to gather together
a powerful force; his captains collected the native
troops from the various provinces of Egypt, while
he sent a number of emissaries Into Asia, who were
instructed to raise a large body of mercenaries in
that quarter. At last all was ready, and Menephthah
appointed the fourteenth day as that on which he would
place himself at the head of his army and lead them
in person against the enemy; but, before the day came,
his courage failed him. He “saw in a dream”—at
least so he himself declares—“as
it were a figure of the god Phthah, standing so as
to prevent his advance;” and the figure said
to him, “Stay where thou art, and let thy troops
proceed against the enemy.” So the pious
king, in obedience to this convenient vision, remained
secure behind the walls of Memphis, and sent his forces,
native and mercenary, into the nome of Prosopis against
the Libyans. The two armies joined battle on the
3rd of Epiphi (May 18), and a desperate engagement
took place, in which, after six hours of hard fighting,
the Egyptians were victorious, and the confederates
suffered a severe defeat. Menephthah charges the
Libyan chief with cowardice, but only because, after
the battle was lost, he precipitately quitted the
field, leaving behind him, not only his camp-equipage,
but his throne, the ornaments of his wives, his bow,
his quiver, and his sandals. The reproaches uttered
recoil upon himself. Whose conduct is the more
cowardly, that of the man who fights at the head of
his troops for six hours against an enemy, probably
more numerous, certainly better armed and better disciplined,
and only quits the field when his forces are utterly
overthrown and put to flight; or that of one who avoids
exposing himself to danger, and lurks behind the walls
of a fortress while his soldiers are affronting wounds
and death in the battlefield? There is no evidence
that Marmaiu, son of Deid, in the battle of Prosopis,
conducted himself otherwise than as became a prince
and a general; there is abundant evidence that Menephthah,
son of Ramesses, who declined to be present at the
engagement, showed the white feather.