the nations bordering on Upper Syria, and formed a confederacy which had for its object to resist the further progress of the Egyptians, and, if possible, to drive them from Asia.  This confederacy embraced the Nairi, or people of Western Mesopotamia, reckoned by the Egyptians among their subjects; the Airatu or people of Aradus; the Masu or inhabitants of the Mous Masius; the Leka, perhaps Lycians; the inhabitants of Carchemish, of Kadesh on the Orontes, of Aleppo, Anaukasa, Akarita, &c.—­all warlike races, and accustomed to the use of chariots.  Khitasir’s proceedings, having become known to Ramesses, afforded ample grounds for a rupture, and quite justified him in pouring his troops into Syria, and doing his best to meet and overcome the danger which threatened him.  Unaware at what point his enemy would elect to meet him, he marched forward cautiously, having arranged his troops in four divisions, which might mutually support each other.  Entering the Coelesyrian valley from the south, he had proceeded as far as the lake of Hems, and neighbourhood of Kadesh, before he received any tidings of the position taken up by the confederate army.  There his troops captured two of the enemy’s scouts, and on questioning them were told that the Hittite army had been at Kadesh, but had retired on learning the Egyptian’s advance and taken up a position near Aleppo, distant nearly a hundred miles to the north-east.  Had Ramesses believed the scouts, and marched forward carelessly, he would have fallen into a trap, and probably suffered defeat; for the whole confederate army was massed just beyond the lake, and there lay concealed by the embankment which blocks the lake at its lower end.  But the Egyptian king was too wary for his adversary.  He ordered the scouts to be examined by scourging, to see if they would persist in their tale, whereupon they broke down and revealed the true position of the army.  The battle had thus the character of a regular pitched engagement, without surprise or other accident on either side.  Khitasir, finding himself foiled, quitted his ambush, and marched openly against the Egyptians, with his troops marshalled in exact and orderly array, the Hittite chariots in front with their lines carefully dressed, and the auxiliaries and irregulars on the flanks and rear.  Of the four divisions of the Egyptian army, one seems to have been absent, probably acting as a rear-guard; Ramesses, with one, marched down the left bank of the stream, while the two remaining divisions proceeded along the right bank, a slight interval separating them.  Khitasir commenced the fight by a flank movement to the left, which brought him into collision with the extreme Egyptian right, “the brigade of Ra,” as it was called, and enabled him to engage that division separately.  His assault was irresistible.  “Foot and horse of King Ramesses,” we are told, “gave way before him,” the “brigade of Ra” was utterly routed, and either cut to pieces or driven from the