Our Ancestors that gave no names to things, but by a directing prudence, purposing to distinguish the works of Nature and Art, had an especiall regard to the naturall resemblance they had with any thing that was most known to them, and that was already distinguisht by its character, or to any one of their most prevailing properties, or to the principall action that distinguisht them from other beings.  They made use of almost the same artifice, to impose names upon things more expressive of their properties, by considering them only with reference to their operations, of which they were the immediate principles.  As for the operations, themselves being not aequally knowne, nor aequally obvious to sense they plac’t the same subordination in the terms they made use of to represent them, that Nature hath establisht in our apprehensions and cognisances.

There being therefore nothing in the world of which they could have fram’d a more distinct Idea, then of the motion of bodies; which is obvious to all the senses, we must not wonder if considering Locall motion as the first and principall object of their knowledge, they afterwards gave no names to the Operations of each being, but such as seem’d to express some relation either to motion in generall, or to its different species, or to some one of its dependances such as are place, figure, situation, extention, Union and seperation, in a word to all the resemblances and agreements that in any way or kind relye upon motion.  For if Modern Philosophy that Studies Nature by a closer application then formerly, pretend to a clear and evident explication of Naturall effects in the referring them all to the Sole movement of matter as their true cause; there is much more reason that in order to the giveing an account of all that is to this day past among the Languages, we should have recours to such terms as are expressive of motion, since it is not to be doubted but that all others that are reducible, may be referr’d hither as to the first principle of their signfication.

Besides motion is allow’d a far greater Scope and extent among the Languages then in Nature for ’tis to that we referr our most refin’d and spirituall conceptions I mean such as we frame of the operations of our souls and the propensions of our wills, So when we say that the mind or understanding applyes it self to think, to conceive, to discours, to explaine, to disimbroile, to disingage a businesse, to discover a truth; when we talke of troubles, aversions, of hurries and consternations of the soul, to expresse such actions as are most remote from sense, we make use of such Images as are corporeall in their first originall, although for the most part they have lost their proper significance to assume another that is purely figurative.