to their convict servants, and carrying it to the credit of the government, an immediate saving of L5 per man, and L3 10s. per woman would be effected.  And if the calculation be accurate that each male convict victualled and clothed at the expence of the crown costs L18, and each female L12 10s. it will be seen that above one fourth more might be supported by the government in the manner here recommended, and that likewise a fifth might be annually added to the number, without occasioning any increase whatever in the colonial expenditure.  The weight too of this mode of retrenchment would not fall on the settler, and by operating as a check to agriculture perhaps prolong the period when the various departments of industry will be enabled to absorb the large mass of labour which is annually regurgitated on the shores of this colony, but on the convicts themselves, to whose reformation indeed, (the primary object of its foundation) it is essential that every incentive to the renewal of their ancient disorderly and profligate habits should be withdrawn.  Even with this diminished scale of wages, the situation of the convicts would be far preferable to that of the labouring class in this country.  L2 10s. to the men, and L1 10s. to the women, would then remain, independently of their food and clothing, which is surely quite sufficient for the “menus plaisirs” of a set of persons who are supposed to be smarting under the lash of the law.  Article fifth needs no explanation.  Article sixth, contemplates the saving that might be effected in the public works of the government, by exchanging at the expiration of the period, when the bounty to be allowed to settlers with convicts shall cease, the present mode of carrying them on by a body of men, victualled and clothed at the expence of the crown, for the more economical plan of contracting for them with the lowest bidder.  I limit the commencement of this method of retrenchment to the above period, because so long as a necessity exists for giving a bounty with convicts, there can be no doubt that it would be judicious for the government to profit as far as possible by the labour of persons whom even in the employment of individuals, they would be in a great measure obliged to support.  But the moment this necessity shall cease, it is equally indubitable that a considerable saving might be effected by carrying on the public works by contract.  Where a body of fourteen or fifteen hundred convicts are employed under the superintendence of the most active and upright man, there will always be a system of idleness and plunder, which his assiduity will never be able entirely to baffle.  Out of the immense number of minor agents on whose intelligence and integrity he would be obliged to place a considerable degree of dependence, it is not readily to be believed, however great may be his activity and discrimination, that he would not be frequently deceived, and that those very men on whom he most relied to suppress the dishonest