I would not that it should be considered from the foregoing remarks that the colonists are averse to taxation.  On the contrary, it is my belief that they would cheerfully contribute whatever may be necessary for the promotion of objects purely colonial; but they expect, and have a right to do so, that all such objects should be submitted to the consideration and approval of their representatives, and that their money should not be taken out of their pockets, whether they will or not, by the mere ipse dixit of a governor.  Few are discontented with the present rate of taxation, because it is moderate; and, with the exception of that small part of the colonial revenue which arises from duties on articles of export, may be even considered judicious; inasmuch as the great bulk of the duties falls on luxuries which can be dispensed with, without occasioning any material diminution of comfort and enjoyment.  But all are averse to the manner in which these duties are levied; for if they once admit that a governor has the right to exact one farthing by his single authority, what limits can be afterwards assigned to the exercise of this power?  He may on the very same principle tax every article of consumption, and on the plea of public contributions undermine the whole prosperity and happiness of the community.  That the different governors have been allowed to prosecute this system without opposition for so many years, could only have arisen from the peculiar constitution of this colony; but its population has now attained a degree of consequence and respectability, which will not much longer tamely permit such an unprecedented deviation from all constitutional authority; and the best way to obviate the unpleasant circumstances of the contest, to which a continuance of the present system must shortly give rise, is to create a body legally endowed with the powers of legislation.

On the expediency of appointing a council, his Majesty’s ministers are, I believe, themselves agreed; and I will not, therefore, enter at great length on the subject.  The arbitrary and revolting acts, which the want of a controlling body of this nature has already occasioned, furnish the most convincing proof of its necessity.  No power, in fact, could be established, which would at one and the same time prove so firm a defence to the subject, and so stable a support to the executive.  A council in the colonies bears many points of resemblance to the House of Lords in this country.  It forms that just equipoise between the democratic and supreme powers of the state, which has been found not less necessary to repress the licentiousness of the one, than to curb the tyranny of the other.  Besides, it at all times provides a remedy for the inexperience or ignorance of governors; and is a sort of nucleus, round which all new bodies may easily agglomerate.  Like a handful of veterans in a newly raised regiment, it will be capable of setting in motion the whole machinery of the government, and establishing with the greatest celerity that organization and discipline which are as requisite in administration as in war.  There is but one precaution to be observed in the formation of the council:  it is to give the members of it an adequate salary, or in other words to insure the independent and conscientious discharge of the duties of their highly important office.