The atmosphere was thus cleared before the Assembly approached another and only less delicate question.  Some time before the Budget disclosed the heavy military expenditure to be defrayed out of Indian revenues, the recommendations of the Committee appointed under the presidency of Lord Esher to inquire into the administration and organisation of the army in India had caused widespread alarm.  There were peculiar circumstances connected with the Committee’s Report which were calculated to excite Indian suspicion.  The first part, which laid down the general principles in regard to organisation and administration, was drawn up in London and received the approval of the Secretary of State for India before the British members of the Committee proceeded to India, where their Indian colleagues for the first time joined them, whilst the President, Lord Esher, himself never went to India at all.  To carry out these principles the Report stated that “the centre of gravity of probable military operations has shifted from West to East.  In the future we must contemplate the possibility of our armies operating in the Middle East based partially in India and partially at home....  India has now been admitted into partnership with the Empire, and the Indian Army has fought alongside of troops from other parts of the Empire in every theatre of war.  Its responsibilities have thus been greatly widened, and it can no longer be regarded as a local force whose sphere of activity is limited to India and the surrounding frontier territories.  It must rather be treated as a part of the Imperial Army ready to serve in any part of the world.”  Indians interpreted the Report as an attempt on the part of the British War Office to throw upon the Indian Exchequer the cost of a larger army than would be required merely for Indian defence whilst keeping it under its own control for employment at the discretion of British Ministers far beyond the frontiers of India.  Official assurances were given both in India and at home that an exaggerated construction had been placed on the meaning of the Report, to which, moreover, neither the British Government nor the Government of India was officially committed, and that in any case Indian troops would not be required to serve outside India except with the consent of the Government of India.  These assurances did not prevent the Assembly from passing two Resolutions in which it embodied its strong protests.  The second part of the Report, containing practical recommendations for the reorganisation of the Indian Army, and alone based on the results of the inquiry actually conducted in India, was far less criticised.