though perhaps fewer, political supporters, amongst
the land-owning classes. The old Congress platform
was, moreover, drawn up by and for the
intelligentsia
of the towns, who had little in common with the great
rural population of India; and in so far as it professed
to champion also the agricultural interests of the
country, it preferred to concentrate its attacks on
the general system of Indian land revenue and to press
for its revision on the lines of the “permanent
settlement” in Bengal—not so much
perhaps on account of any intrinsic merits of that
“settlement,” as because it was identified
with the province which was then regarded as in the
van of Indian political progress and enlightenment.
The “permanent settlement” in Bengal,
effected more than a century and a quarter ago by
Lord Cornwallis under a complete misapprehension, as
was afterwards realised, of the position of the Bengalee
zemindars, determined once and for all the
proportion of land revenue which Government was entitled
to collect in the province, instead of leaving it,
as in other parts of India it is still left, to be
varied from time to time after periodical inquiry
into the constantly varying yield and value of the
land. The result in Bengal has been highly satisfactory
from the point of view of the large land-owners whose
property has appreciated enormously with the general
growth of prosperity during a long period, unprecedented
in its earlier annals, of internal and external peace.
It has been less satisfactory to the tenants with
inferior and infinitely subdivided interests who have
shared very little in the increased wealth of their
superior landlords, and nowhere else has sub-infeudation
been carried to such extravagant lengths. But
for the State, above all, the results have been singularly
unfortunate, as it has debarred itself from taking
toll of the unearned increment that has been constantly
accruing to the
zemindars.
So long as the National Congress saw little or no
hope of securing the transfer of any substantial share
in the governance of the country to Indian shoulders,
it could afford to indulge in wholesale criticism of
Government finance and to propose sweeping changes
without stopping to consider ways and means or to
weigh the ultimate effects upon the revenue of the
State, and it was easy for it to court popularity by
inveighing against the land tax and advocating the
extension of the “permanent settlement”
to the whole of India as a sovereign panacea.
But sober Indian politicians have begun to look farther
ahead and to reckon with the costs of the many popular
reforms which Indian Ministers will be expected to
carry through in the new Councils. Mr. Gandhi
and his followers, who are determined if possible
to wreck them, are deterred by no such considerations,
and the non-payment of the land tax, which must remain
the backbone of Indian revenue, already figures in
their programme of “Non-co-operation,”
of which the avowed object is to paralyse Government