passed up the river, with the intention, as general Clay supposed, of attacking fort Winchester:  this movement, as was subsequently ascertained, being also intended to deceive the commander of the fort.  On the 25th the enemy removed to the south side of the river, and encamped behind a point of woods which partly concealed them from the view of the garrison.  This, taken in connection with other circumstances, led general Clay to think that an effort would be made to carry the post by assault.  Early on the morning of the 26th captain M’Cune reached the fort in safety.  In the afternoon of that day, the enemy practised a well devised stratagem for the purpose of drawing general Clay and his troops from their fastness.  On the Sandusky road, just before night, a heavy firing of rifles and muskets was heard:  the Indian yell broke upon the ear, and the savages were seen attacking with great impetuosity a column of men, who were soon thrown into confusion; they, however, rallied, and in turn the Indians gave way.  The idea flew through the fort that general Harrison was approaching with a body of reinforcements; and the troops under general Clay seized their arms, and with nearly all the officers in the garrison, demanded to be led to the support of their friends.  General Clay was unable to explain the firing, but wisely concluded, from the information received in the morning by captain M’Cune, that there could be no reinforcements in the neighborhood of the fort.  He had the prudent firmness to resist the earnest importunity of his officers and men, to be led to the scene of action.  The enemy finding that the garrison could not be drawn out, and a heavy shower of rain beginning to fall, terminated their sham-battle.  It was subsequently ascertained that this was a stratagem, devised by Tecumseh, for the purpose of decoying out a part of the force under general Clay, which was to have been attacked and cut off by the Indians; while the British troops were to carry the fort by storm.  But for the opportune arrival of the express in the morning of this day, and the cool judgment of the commander, there is great reason to suppose that this admirably planned manoeuvre would have succeeded; which must have resulted in the total destruction of the garrison, the combined force of the enemy, then investing fort Meigs, being about five thousand in number, while the troops under general Clay were but a few hundred strong.  The enemy remained around the fort but one day after the failure of this ingenious stratagem, and on the 28th embarked with their stores, and proceeded down the lake.