to be yielded to justice; let us obey the dictates of expediency, which is only justice looked at from another side; let us concede much to generosity; but in the name of common sense, of honesty, and of manliness, let us hear no more of necessity.  Once in an age necessity may be the defence of statesmanship forced to confess its own blindness, but it is far more often the plea of tyranny, of ambition, of cowardice, or despair.

B. No danger in Home Rule.  The arguments which are employed to show that the policy of Home Rule and the new constitution which embodies it involve no danger for England are in the main drawn from the ‘Safeguards’ or Restrictions contained in the Bill—­from the alleged precedent of Grattan’s Constitution—­from the success of Home Rule in other parts of the world—­and, generally, from the expediency of trustfulness.

i. The Safeguards.  The Restrictions on the power of the Irish Parliament are, it is asserted, sufficient and more than sufficient to reassure Unionists, and an intimation is sometimes added that, if further security is wanted, further safeguards may be provided.

This ground of confidence may be briefly dismissed; its answer is in effect supplied by the foregoing pages.

On the action of the Irish Executive the Restrictions place, and from the nature of things can place, no restraint whatever, and yet both England and the Irish Loyalists have far more reason to dread the abuse of executive than of legislative authority.  On the legal action of the Irish Parliament the Restrictions do place a certain restraint, but the Restrictions are, as already shown, not in reality enforceable.  They are for good purposes a nullity; they are effective, if at all, almost wholly for evil; they exhibit the radical and fatal inconsistency of Gladstonian policy.  The policy of Home Rule is a policy of absolute and unrestricted trust; the safeguards are based on distrust.  There is something to be said for generous confidence, and something also for distrustful prudence; there is nothing to be said for ineffective suspicion.

ii. Grattan’s Constitution.  From the asserted harmony between England and Ireland from 1782 to 1800 under Grattan’s Constitution, the inference is drawn that there is no reason to fear discord between England and Ireland under the Gladstonian constitution of 1893.

The fallacy underlying the appeal to this precedent has been, to use words of Mr. Lecky, ’so frequently exposed that I can only wonder at its repetition.’[112] Under Grattan’s Constitution the Irish Executive was appointed, not by the Irish Parliament, but by the English Ministry; the Irish Parliament consisted solely of Protestants; it represented the miscalled ‘English garrison,’ and was in sympathy with the governing classes of England.  With all this to promote harmony, the concord between the governing powers in England and in Ireland was dubious.  The rejection of England’s proposals as to trade,