unreal; they do not repay examination; whether there be two sham modes of enforcement, or one, must be to a sensible man a matter of indifference.  As to the disallowance of Acts see Rules and Regulations published for the use of the Colonial Office, chap. iii.; Legislative Councils and Assemblies, Rules 48-54; British North America Act, 1868, sections 55-57; England’s Case against Home Rule (3rd ed.), p. 33. [Compare Dicey, Law of Constitution (7th ed.), pp. 111-114.]

[75] The appeal to the English Privy Council, both under clauses 19, 22, and 23 of the Bill, appears to be in each case an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. [The particular provisions contained in the Home Rule Bill, 1893, as to an appeal to the Privy Council, etc., are now of little direct importance, but they are worth study as showing the extreme difficulty of providing any satisfactory body for acting as a Court called upon to decide the numerous constitutional questions, as to the legislative power of an Irish Parliament, which must be raised under any Home Rule Act whatever.]

[76] See Bill, clause 23.

[77] See Tocqueville, Democratie en Amerique, i. chap. viii. pp. 231-250; Bryce, American Commonwealth, ii. (1st ed.) p. 45; ibid. i. ch. 23.

[78] Compare England’s Case against Home Rule (3rd ed.), pp. 257, 258.

[79] Compare Bill, clauses 19, 22, pp. 206, 209, post.

[80] Bill, clause 19, sub-clause(4).

[81] Clause 19, sub-clause (5).  The whole of the provisions as to the Exchequer Judges are extremely obscure.  The jurisdiction and the powers of the Court, should it ever be formed, will need to be defined by a special Act of Parliament.  There are special laws regulating the action of the Federal Judiciary both in the United States and in Switzerland.  As the matter at present stands the jurisdiction of the Exchequer Judges and of the Privy Council as a Court of Appeal from them may apparently be thus described.

It extends to all legal proceedings in Ireland which

     (i) are instituted at the instance of or against the Treasury or
     Commissioners of Customs, or any of their officers, or

     (ii) relate to the election of members to serve in [the Imperial]
     Parliament, or

     (iii) touch any matter not within the powers of the Irish
     Legislature, or

     (iv) touch any matter affected by a law which the Irish Legislature
     have not power to repeal or alter.

It is possible that sub-clause (4) gives the Exchequer Judges a much wider jurisdiction than is intended by the authors of the Home Rule Bill, and the strictures which have been made on this sub-clause deserve attention.  My purpose, however, is not to criticise the details of the Home Rule Bill or to suggest amendments thereto.  Its fundamental principle is, in the eyes of every Unionist, unsound, and the Bill itself therefore unamendable.  My object is simply to describe and criticise the general constitutional provisions of the Bill and to show their bearing and effect.