Restraints again are placed on the unconstitutional action of the Imperial or Federal Parliament.  They are less obvious, but at least as real and effectual as the safeguards against the breach of the constitution by the Irish government or legislature.  They are all summed up in the presence of the Irish representatives at Westminster.  The only legitimate reason, if legitimate reason there be, for their presence is the guardianship of Irish rights under the constitution.  It is for them to see that these rights are held sacred.  No diminution thereof can take place without either the assent of the Irish members or else the existence of such a majority in the Parliament at Westminster as may override the protests of Ireland.[23] No doubt this is not an absolute security.  But whoever considers the habits of English political life will conclude that, except in the event of the Imperial Parliament being resolved to suspend or destroy the constitution, there exists the highest improbability that any inroad should be made upon the privileges conferred under the new constitution upon Ireland.  The security, though not absolute, is a good deal better than any safeguard given by the Bill that the State rights of Great Britain shall be duly respected by the representatives from Ireland.  Assume, however, that the constitution works properly, and that all parties respect the spirit of its provisions.  The result is that the new constitution forms a fundamental law, fixing the respective rights of Ireland, of Great Britain, of the Irish Parliament, and of the Imperial Parliament.[24]

The federal arrangements which, utterly unknown as they are to our institutions, form the foundation of the new constitution, are as nothing compared with the recognition and fostering of the federal spirit.

Great Britain and Ireland constitute for the first time in history a confederation.  The difference or opposition of their interests receives legislative acknowledgment:  each country is to possess in reality, though not in name, State rights; each must rely upon the constitution for the protection of these rights; each may suffer from the encroachments of the Imperial or central power.  Ireland may complain that the Imperial Parliament by legislation, or the Privy Council by judicial interpretation, encroaches on her guaranteed rights.  Great Britain may complain either that Irish members intermeddle in British affairs, and thus British rights are violated, or that the Privy Council so interprets the constitution that the prerogatives of the Central Government (which be it remembered must in practice be identified with the power of England) are unduly diminished.  To imagine such complaints is not to assume that the constitution works badly.  They are of necessity inherent in the federal system.  There exists no federal government throughout the world where such complaints do not arise, and where they do not at times give rise to heart-burnings.