this year, since that of last year, and that trade
is the harvest that sustains this country. Consequently
it has become very necessary to encourage the citizens,
seeking innumerable methods of consolation, and facilitating
their protection for the future with what means we
have. I am trying to notify and assure them that
your Majesty’s reenforcements and protection
will not fail them—adducing (and in good
faith on my part) all possible reasons why we should
promise ourselves and expect that relief, when your
Majesty learns into how great ruin this country has
fallen. For one cannot believe that your Majesty
will permit the risking of what it is so important
to preserve, both for the continuation of the conversion
of these souls and that of so many as one may hope
will be reduced to the pathway of salvation—a
thing by which our Lord will be so well served; and
for the reputation and even the profit of the treasury,
which will not be slight, and which will follow by
maintaining these islands. For if we had a fleet
sufficient to be able to pursue the enemy, they could
not maintain themselves from that day on which we
would thus oblige them to divert their attention from
their gains and trading, in order to join together
for defense. It is quite certain that, in that
case, there would be no one in this archipelago who
would do anything to lessen respect for your Majesty’s
arms. By doing that, a million per cent would
be gained over what was spent on it. Otherwise,
if the enemy enjoy in any quiet what they claim here,
it would appear that they might disturb the peace
of Portuguese Yndia, and even of some portions of
the Indias of Castilla [i.e., the Spanish colonies
in America], and other places. That would give
reason for anxiety, because of the so great wealth
that the enemy would thus obtain. It is quite
easy to prove this statement, since with only their
plundering and the profits from their business, and
without their having any right or dominion in anything
of importance, the enemy repair the expenses and losses
of war, and make the gains that they are known to
secure. Will your Majesty please have this matter
considered, and have an efficient reenforcement of
seamen and soldiers sent—all at once, or
as soon as may be possible—so that having
their arms in one fleet, aid may be thus given where
and how it is considered most advisable to your royal
service. To that I shall attend with what forces
I shall have, whether many or few, as will be shown
by their deeds—to which I refer, without
promising more than the fulfilment of my obligations,
with God’s help. In order to do thus, I
have represented all the above, concluding with what
is of most importance to this government, which is
reduced, in my opinion, to three points: namely,
the commerce of China and Nueva Espana; the protection
and preservation of the natives; and having the sword
in the hand, so that one may achieve what is needed
and make all things clear. Taking this last point