the truth be not in the medium of communication rather than elsewhere; and, indeed, whether the philosopher be not aiming to communicate thoughts on subjects on which man can have no thoughts to communicate.  Socrates would add, perhaps, that language was given us to express, not to conceal our thoughts; and that, if they cannot be communicated, invaluable as they doubtless are, we had better keep them to ourselves; one thing it is clear he would do,—­he would insist on precise defintions.  But in truth it may be more than surmised that the obscurities of which all complain, except those (and in our day they are not a few) to whom obscurity is a recommendation, result from suffering the intellect to speculate in realms forbidden to its access; into caverns of tremendous depth and darkness, with nothing better than our own rushlight.  Surely we have reason to suspect as much when some learned professor, after muttering his logical incantations, and conjuring with his logical formulae, surprises you by saying, that he has disposed of the great mysteries of existence and the universe, and solved to your entire satisfaction, in his own curt way, the problems of the absolute and the infinite!  If the cardinal truths of philosophy and religion hitherto received are doomed to be imperilled by such speculations, one feels strongly inclined to pray with the old Homeric hero,—­’that if they must perish, it may be at least in daylight.’  We earnestly counsel the youthful reader to defer the study of German philosophy, at least till he has matured and disciplined his mind, and familiarised himself with the best models of what used to be our boast—­English clearness of thought and expression.  He will then learn to ask rigidly for definitions, and not rest satisfied with half-meanings—­or no meaning.  To the naturally venturous pertinacity of young metaphysicians, few would be disposed to be more indulgent than ourselves.  From the time of Plato downwards—­who tells us that no sooner do they ‘taste’ of dialectics than they are ready to dispute with every body—­’sparing neither father nor mother, scarcely even the lower animals,’ if they had but a voice to reply.  They have always expected more from metaphysics than (except as a discipline) they will ever yield.  He elsewhere, still more humorously describes the same trait.  He compares then, to young dogs who are perpetually snapping at every thing about them:—­Hoimai gar se ou lelethenai, hoti hoi meirakiskoi, hotan to proton logon geuontai, os paidia autois katachrontai, aei eis antilogian chromenoi kai mimoumenoi tous exelenchontas autoi allous elenchousi, chairontes osper skulakia te kai sparattein tous plesion aei.  But we hope we shall not see our metaphysical ‘puppies’ amusing themselves—­as so many ‘old dogs’ amongst neighbours (who ought to have known better) have done,—­by tearing into tatters the sacred leaves of that volume, which contains what is better than all their philosophy.