Very well? Isn’t slavery traffic?
It’s buying and selling. It impresses things
that are bought and sold—cotton. And
slaves are the subject of traffic. Therefore
to regulate it—keep the slaves out of the
territories where they might be bought and sold after
getting into the territories, as well as where they
might be sold into the territories—is the
regulation of commerce, isn’t it? Well now,
isn’t that better than calling the territories
property and subject to the arbitrary rule of Congress
as merely inert matter? If you can rule the territories
arbitrarily as to slavery, why not as to anything else?
Suppose we annex Cuba; under this doctrine we could
rule Cuba arbitrarily, just as England ruled the Colonies
here arbitrarily. Then take the assumption that
Congress has the power to keep slavery out of the
territories; just the power, not the express duty;
well, it follows that Congress has the power to let
it in the territories. If it can put it in or
out of the territories it can leave the territories
to put it in or out. And why isn’t that
best? Right here is the point of my adherence
to Douglas. For I see a growing central power
in this country not acting on its lawful authority,
but upon its own will, dictated by theories of morality
or trade or monopoly. If this matter is left to
the territories it is left to the source of sovereign
power and to local interests; if it is controlled
by Congress it means an increasing centralization.
What I really mean is that this mere assumption that
Congress can deal with the matter in virtue of some
vague sovereignty, without pointing out some express
power in Congress to do so, leads straight to imperialism.
And thus on the whole, having a regard for the future
of America and its liberty, I stand with Douglas.
I have read Webster in his theories that the territories
are property, and can therefore be dealt with under
the clause which empowers Congress to make all needful
laws and regulations for the territory and other property
of the United States. Well, why doesn’t
he go farther and let Congress at one stroke emancipate
the slaves? For a slave is certainly property,
and if needful rules and regulations as to the negro
require his emancipation, why can’t he be emancipated
under this clause? But if territory is property,
so is a slave. And if territory is property, who
owns the property? Why, all the states of course.
And if they own the land and own the slaves too, why
can’t they take into their own land, unless
they are forbidden to do so by a majority of the states,
representatives legislating under some clause of the
Constitution which gives them the right to do so?”