the power to intervene did not exist; and the government breathed easier.  Again the Privy Council reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court and held that because the Manitoba law prejudicially affected educational privileges enjoyed by the minority after union there was a right of intervention.  The last defence of the Dominion government against being forced to make a decision was broken down; in the language of to-day, it was up against it.  And the man who might have saved the party by inducing the bishops of the Catholic church to moderate their demands was gone, for Sir John Thompson died in Windsor Castle in December, 1894, one month before the Privy Council handed down its fateful decision.  Sir John was a faithful son of the church, with an immense influence with the clerical authorities; he was succeeded in the premiership by Sir Mackenzie Bowell, ex-grand master of the Orange Order.  The bishops moved on Ottawa and demanded action.

There ensued a duel in tactics between the two parties, intensely interesting in character and in its results surprising, at least for some people.  The parties to the struggle which now proceeded to convulse Canada were the government of Manitoba, the author of the law in question, the Roman Catholic hierarchy in their capacity of guardians and champions of the Manitoba minority, and the two Dominion political parties.  The bishops were in deadly earnest in attack; so was the Manitoba government in defence; but with the others the interest was purely tactical.  How best to set the sails to catch the veering winds and blustering gusts to win the race, the prize for which was the government of Canada?  The Conservatives had the right of initiative—­did it give them the advantage?  They thought so; and so did most of the Liberal generals who were mostly in a blue funk during the year 1895 in anticipation of the hole into which the government was going to place them.  But there was at least one Liberal tactician who knew better.

The Conservatives decided upon a line of action which seemed to them to have the maximum of advantage.  They would go in for remedial legislation.  In the English provinces they would say that they did this reluctantly as good, loyal, law-abiding citizens obeying the order of the Queen delivered through the Privy Council.  From their experiences with the electors they had good reason to believe that this buncombe would go down.  But in Quebec they would pose as the defenders of the oppressed, loyal co-operators with the bishops in rebuking, subduing and chaining the Manitoba tyrants.  Obviously they would carry the province; if Laurier opposed their legislation they would sweep the province and he would be left without a shred of the particular support which was supposed to be his special contribution to a Liberal victory.  The calculation looked good to the Conservatives; also to most of the Liberals.  As one Liberal veteran put it in 1895:  “If we vote against remedial legislation we shall be lost, hook, line and sinker.”  But there was one Liberal who thought differently.