Douglas was among those unimpressionable younger men who would not believe the Union to be in danger.  Perhaps by his Southern connections he knew better than most Northern men, the real temper of the South.  Perhaps he did not give way to the prevailing hysteria, because he was diverted from the great issues by the pressing, particular interests of his constituents.  At all events, he had this advantage over Clay, Webster, and Calhoun, that when he did turn his attention to schemes of compromise, his vision was fresh, keen, and direct.  He escaped that subtle distortion of mental perception from which others were likely to suffer because of long-sustained attention.  To such, Douglas must have seemed unemotional, unsensitive, and lacking in spiritual fineness.

Illinois with its North and its South was also facing a crisis.  To the social and political differences that bisected the State, was added a keen commercial rivalry between the sections.  While the State legislature under northern control was appropriating funds for the Illinois and Michigan canal, it exhibited far less liberality in building railroads, which alone could be the arteries of traffic in southern Illinois.  At a time when railroads were extending their lines westward from the Atlantic seaboard, and reaching out covetously for the produce of the Mississippi Valley, Illinois held geographically a commanding position.  No roads could reach the great river, north of the Ohio at least, without crossing her borders.  The avenues of approach were given into her keeping.  To those who directed State policy, it seemed possible to determine the commercial destinies of the Commonwealth by controlling the farther course of the railroads which now touched the eastern boundary.  Well-directed effort, it was thought, might utilize these railroads so as to build up great commercial cities on the eastern shore of the Mississippi.  State policy required that none of these cross-roads should in any event touch St. Louis, and thus make it, rather than the Illinois towns now struggling toward commercial greatness, the entrepot between East and West.  With its unrivalled site at the mouth of the Missouri, Alton was as likely a competitor for the East and West traffic, and for the Mississippi commerce, as St. Louis.  Alton, then, must be made the terminus of the cross-roads.[327]

The people of southern Illinois thought otherwise.  Against the background of such distant hopes, they saw a concrete reality.  St. Louis was already the market for their produce.  From every railroad which should cross the State and terminate at St. Louis, they anticipated tangible profits.  They could not see why these very real advantages should be sacrificed on the altar of northern interests.  After the opening of the northern canal, they resented this exclusive policy with increased bitterness.