A man of less audacity would have hesitated to swell this tide of eloquence, and at first, it seemed as though Douglas had little but vehemence to add to the eulogies already pronounced.  There was nothing novel in the assertion that Jackson had neither violated the Constitution by declaring martial law at New Orleans, nor assumed any authority which was not “fully authorized and legalized by his position, his duty, and the unavoidable necessity of the case.”  The House was used to these dogmatic reiterations.  But Douglas struck into untrodden ways when he contended, that even if Jackson had violated the laws and the Constitution, his condemnation for contempt of court was “unjust, irregular and illegal.”  Every unlawful act is not necessarily a contempt of court, he argued.  “The doctrine of contempts only applies to those acts which obstruct the proceedings of the court, and against which the general laws of the land do not afford adequate protection....  It is incumbent upon those who defend and applaud the conduct of the judge to point out the specific act done by General Jackson which constituted a contempt of court.  The mere declaration of martial law is not of that character....  It was a matter over which the civil tribunals had no jurisdiction, and with which they had no concern, unless some specific crime had been committed or injury done; and not even then until it was brought before them according to the forms of law."[166]

The old hero had never had a more adroit counsel.  Like a good lawyer, Douglas seemed to feel himself in duty bound to spar for every technical advantage, and to construe the law, wherever possible, in favor of his client.  At the same time he did not forget that the House was the jury in this case, and capable of human emotions upon which he might play.  At times he became declamatory beyond the point of good taste.  In voice and manner he betrayed the school in which he had been trained.  “When I hear gentlemen,” he cried in strident tones, “attempting to justify this unrighteous fine upon General Jackson upon the ground of non-compliance with rules of court and mere formalities, I must confess that I cannot appreciate the force of the argument.  In cases of war and desolation, in times of peril and disaster, we should look at the substance and not the shadow of things.  I envy not the feelings of the man who can reason coolly and calmly about the force of precedents and the tendency of examples in the fury of the war-cry, when ‘booty and beauty’ is the watchword.  Talk not to me about rules and forms in court when the enemy’s cannon are pointed at the door, and the flames encircle the cupola!  The man whose stoicism would enable him to philosophize coolly under these circumstances would fiddle while the Capitol was burning, and laugh at the horror and anguish that surrounded him in the midst of the conflagration!  I claim not the possession of these remarkable feelings.  I concede them all to those who think that the savior of New Orleans ought to be treated like a criminal for not possessing them in a higher degree.  Their course in this debate has proved them worthy disciples of the doctrine they profess.  Let them receive all the encomiums which such sentiments are calculated to inspire."[167]