It was infinitely to his credit that when he confronted a hostile audience on the next evening, he stooped to no cheap devices to divert resentment, but sought to approve his course to the sober intelligence of his hearers.[370] It is doubtful if the Fugitive Slave Law ever found a more skillful defender.  The spirit in which he met his critics was admirably calculated to disarm prejudice.  Come and let us reason together, was his plea.  Without any attempt to ignore the most obnoxious parts of the act, he passed directly to the discussion of the clauses which apparently denied the writ of habeas corpus and trial by jury to the fugitive from service.  He reminded his hearers that this act was supplementary to the Act of 1793.  No one had found fault with the earlier act because it had denied these rights.  Both acts, in fact, were silent on these points; yet in neither case was silence to be construed as a denial of constitutional obligations.  On the contrary, they must be assumed to continue in full force under the act.  Misapprehension arose in these matters, because the recovery of the fugitive slave was not viewed as a process of extradition.  The act provided for the return of the alleged slave to the State from which he had fled.  Trial of the facts by jury would then follow under the laws of the State, just as the fugitive from justice would be tried in the State where the alleged crime had been committed.  The testimony before the original court making the requisition, would necessarily be ex parte, as in the case of the escaped criminal; but this did not prevent a fair trial on return of the fugitive.  Regarding the question of establishing the identity of the apprehended person with the fugitive described in the record, Douglas asserted that the terms of the act required proof satisfactory to the judge or commissioner, and not merely the presentment of the record.  “Other and further evidence” might be insisted upon.

At various times Douglas was interrupted by questions which were obviously contrived to embarrass him.  To all such he replied courteously and with engaging frankness.  “Why was it,” asked one of these troublesome questioners, “that the law provided for a fee of ten dollars if the commissioner decided in favor of the claimant, and for a fee of only five dollars if he decided otherwise?  Was this not in the nature of an inducement, a bribe?” “I presume,” said Douglas, “that the reason was that he would have more labor to perform.  If, after hearing the testimony, the commissioner decided in favor of the claimant, the law made it his duty to prepare and authenticate the necessary papers to authorize him to carry the fugitive home; but if he decided against him, he had no such labor to perform.”