process is discharged in hysterical imitation; the way in which a psychic act proceeds and the act itself are two different things.  The latter is slightly more complicated than one is apt to imagine the imitation of hysterical subjects to be:  it corresponds to an unconscious concluded process, as an example will show.  The physician who has a female patient with a particular kind of twitching, lodged in the company of other patients in the same room of the hospital, is not surprised when some morning he learns that this peculiar hysterical attack has found imitations.  He simply says to himself:  The others have seen her and have done likewise:  that is psychic infection.  Yes, but psychic infection proceeds in somewhat the following manner:  As a rule, patients know more about one another than the physician knows about each of them, and they are concerned about each other when the visit of the doctor is over.  Some of them have an attack to-day:  soon it is known among the rest that a letter from home, a return of lovesickness or the like, is the cause of it.  Their sympathy is aroused, and the following syllogism, which does not reach consciousness, is completed in them:  “If it is possible to have this kind of an attack from such causes, I too may have this kind of an attack, for I have the same reasons.”  If this were a cycle capable of becoming conscious, it would perhaps express itself in fear of getting the same attack; but it takes place in another psychic sphere, and, therefore, ends in the realization of the dreaded symptom.  Identification is therefore not a simple imitation, but a sympathy based upon the same etiological claim; it expresses an “as though,” and refers to some common quality which has remained in the unconscious.

Identification is most often used in hysteria to express sexual community.  An hysterical woman identifies herself most readily—­although not exclusively—­with persons with whom she has had sexual relations, or who have sexual intercourse with the same persons as herself.  Language takes such a conception into consideration:  two lovers are “one.”  In the hysterical phantasy, as well as in the dream, it is sufficient for the identification if one thinks of sexual relations, whether or not they become real.  The patient, then, only follows the rules of the hysterical thought processes when she gives expression to her jealousy of her friend (which, moreover, she herself admits to be unjustified, in that she puts herself in her place and identifies herself with her by creating a symptom—­the denied wish).  I might further clarify the process specifically as follows:  She puts herself in the place of her friend in the dream, because her friend has taken her own place relation to her husband, and because she would like to take her friend’s place in the esteem of her husband[2].