There has hitherto been no occasion for philosophers to bestir themselves with a psychology of repression.  We must be allowed to construct some clear conception as to the origin of dreams as the first steps in this unknown territory.  The scheme which we have formulated not only from a study of dreams is, it is true, already somewhat complicated, but we cannot find any simpler one that will suffice.  We hold that our psychical apparatus contains two procedures for the construction of thoughts.  The second one has the advantage that its products find an open path to consciousness, whilst the activity of the first procedure is unknown to itself, and can only arrive at consciousness through the second one.  At the borderland of these two procedures, where the first passes over into the second, a censorship is established which only passes what pleases it, keeping back everything else.  That which is rejected by the censorship is, according to our definition, in a state of repression.  Under certain conditions, one of which is the sleeping state, the balance of power between the two procedures is so changed that what is repressed can no longer be kept back.  In the sleeping state this may possibly occur through the negligence of the censor; what has been hitherto repressed will now succeed in finding its way to consciousness.  But as the censorship is never absent, but merely off guard, certain alterations must be conceded so as to placate it.  It is a compromise which becomes conscious in this case—­a compromise between what one procedure has in view and the demands of the other. Repression, laxity of the censor, compromise—­this is the foundation for the origin of many another psychological process, just as it is for the dream.  In such compromises we can observe the processes of condensation, of displacement, the acceptance of superficial associations, which we have found in the dream work.

It is not for us to deny the demonic element which has played a part in constructing our explanation of dream work.  The impression left is that the formation of obscure dreams proceeds as if a person had something to say which must be agreeable for another person upon whom he is dependent to hear.  It is by the use of this image that we figure to ourselves the conception of the dream distortion and of the censorship, and ventured to crystallize our impression in a rather crude, but at least definite, psychological theory.  Whatever explanation the future may offer of these first and second procedures, we shall expect a confirmation of our correlate that the second procedure commands the entrance to consciousness, and can exclude the first from consciousness.

Once the sleeping state overcome, the censorship resumes complete sway, and is now able to revoke that which was granted in a moment of weakness.  That the forgetting of dreams explains this in part, at least, we are convinced by our experience, confirmed again and again.  During the relation of a dream, or during analysis of one, it not infrequently happens that some fragment of the dream is suddenly forgotten.  This fragment so forgotten invariably contains the best and readiest approach to an understanding of the dream.  Probably that is why it sinks into oblivion—­i.e., into a renewed suppression.