35. This curious incident, which is not mentioned by Thornton in the detailed account of the Nepalese War given in his twenty-fourth chapter, may be the failure of the 53rd Regiment to support General Gllespie in the attack on Kalanga, in 1814, not 1815 (Mill, Bk. II, chap. 1; vol. viii, p. 19, ed. 1858). The war was notable for the number of blunders and failures which marked its earlier stages.
36. Vegetius, De Re Militari, Lib. iii, cap. 4, If corporal punishment be retained at all, it should be limited to the two offences I have already mentioned; [W. H. S.] namely, (l) mutiny or gross insubordination, (2) plunder or violence in the field or on the march. (Ante, chapter 76, note 6.)
37. Polybius says that ’as the human body is apt to get out of order under good feeding and little exercise, so are states and armies.’ (Bk. II, chap. 6.)—Wherever food is cheap, and the air good, native regiments should be well exercised without being worried.
I must here take the liberty to give an extract from a letter from one of the best and most estimable officers now in the Bengal army: ’As connected with the discipline of the native army, I may here remark that I have for some years past observed on the part of many otherwise excellent commanding officers a great want of attention to the instruction of the young European officers on first joining their regiments. I have had ample opportunities of seeing the great value of a regular course of instruction drill for at least six months. When I joined my first regiment, which was about forty years ago, I had the good fortune to be under a commandant and adjutant who, happily for me and many others, attached great importance to this very necessary course of instruction, I then acquired a thorough knowledge of my duties, which led to my being appointed an adjutant very early in life. When I attained the rank of lieutenant-colonel I had, however, opportunities of observing how very much this essential duty had been neglected in certain regiments, and made it a rule in all that I commanded to keep all young officers on first joining at the instruction drill till thoroughly grounded in their duties. Since I ceased to command a regiment, I have taken advantage of every opportunity to express to those commanding officers with whom I have been in correspondence my conviction of the great advantages of this system to the rising generation. In going from one regiment to another I found many curious instances of ignorance on the part of young officers who had been many years with their corps. It was by no means an easy task to convince them that they really knew nothing, or at least had a great deal to learn; but when they were made sensible of it, they many of them turned out excellent officers, and now, I believe, bless the day they were first put under me.’
The advantages of the System here mentioned cannot be questioned; and it is much to be regretted that it is not strictly enforced in every regiment in the service. Young officers may find it irksome at first; but they soon become sensible of the advantages, and learn to applaud the commandant who has had the firmness to consult their permanent interests more than their present inclinations. [W. H. S.]