27.  As the Madras sepoys do.

28.  The writing of the bulk of this work was completed in 1839.  These concluding supplementary chapters on the Bengal army seem to have been written a little later, perhaps in 1841, the year in which they were first printed.  The publication of the complete work took place in 1844.  The Mutiny broke out in 1857, and proved that the fidelity of the sepoys could not be so easily assured as the author supposed.

29.  I believe the native army to be better now than it ever was—­ better in its disposition and in its organization.  The men have now a better feeling of assurance than they formerly had that all their rights will be secured to them by their European officers that all those officers are men of honour, though they have not all of them the same fellow feeling that their officers had with them in former days.  This is because they have not the same opportunity of seeing their courage and fidelity tried in the same scenes of common danger.  Go to Afghanistan and China, and you will find the feeling between officers and men as fine as ever it was in days of yore, whatever it may be at our large and gay stations, where they see so little of each other. [W.  H. S.] The author’s reputation for sagacity and discernment could not be made to rest upon the above remarks.  His judgement was led astray by his lifelong association with and affection for the native troops.  Lord William Bentinck took a far juster view of the situation, and understood far better the real nature of the ties which bind the native army to its masters.  His admirable minute dated 13th March, 1835, published for the first time in Mr. D. Boulger’s well-written little book (Lord William Bentinck, ‘Rulers of India’, pp. 177-201), is still worthy of study.  As a corrective to the author’s too effusive sentiment, some brief passages from the Governor-General’s minute may be quoted.  ’In considering the question of internal danger,’ he observes, ’those officers most conversant with Indian affairs who were examined before the Parliamentary Committee apprehend no danger to our dominion as long as we are assured of the fidelity of our native troops.  To this opinion I entirely subscribe.  But others again view in the native army itself the source of our greatest peril.  In all ages the military body has been often the prime cause, but generally the instrument, of all revolutions; and proverbial almost as is the fidelity of the native soldier to the chief whom he serves, more especially when he is justly and kindly treated, still we cannot be blind to the fact that many of those ties which bind other armies to their allegiance are totally wanting in this.  Here is no patriotism, no community of feeling as to religion or birthplace, no influencing attachment from high considerations, or great honours and rewards.  Our native army also is extremely ignorant, capable of the strongest religions excitement, and very sensitive to disrespect to their persona or infringement of their customs. . . .  In the native army alone rests our internal danger, and this danger may involve our complete subversion. . . .