The town of Ypres is now in complete ruins, and, although it would normally be of importance because of the fact that it is the point of crossing of a number of roads, this importance is destroyed by the fact that it is entirely dominated by the German artillery.  As long as this state of affairs exists the town has practically no strategic value.  All that the Germans can accomplish if they take Ypres will have been a flattening out of the British salient.

Germany cannot be content with occasional bending of the Allies’ line.  The process is too slow and too costly.  Germany has almost, if not quite, reached her maximum strength, and the losses she now suffers will be difficult to replace.  Viewing the situation entirely from the German standpoint, success can only mean breaking through and attacking the two exposed flanks at the point pierced.  This would force a retreat as in the case of the Russian lines along the Dunajec, which will be taken up later on.  No other form of action can be decisive, though it might permit a little more of Belgian or French territory to change hands.  This would, of course, in case the war were declared a draw, give Germany an additional advantage in the discussion of terms of peace, especially if the rule of uti posseditis were applied as a basis from which to begin negotiations.  But this contingency is too remote for present consideration.

As to the probability of German success around Ypres, it seems to grow less as time passes.  After the first rush was over and the British lines had time to re-form Germany has accomplished nothing.  Moreover, it is certain that in back of the short twenty-five miles of line held by the British troops there is a reserve of almost a half million men.  No other portion of the battle line in either theatre has such great latent strength ready to be thrown in when the critical moment comes.  Just why it has not been used so far is a mystery, the solution of which can be found only in the brain of Sir John French.  But it is known to be in France and is there for a purpose.

From Loos to Arras the French have undertaken the most ambitious and the most successful offensive movement made in the west since Winter set in.  The entire French line along this front of twenty-five miles, taking the Germans by surprise, has gone forward a distance varying from one-half to two and a half miles.  The attack was launched at an extremely opportune moment.  The Germans were, in the first place, extremely busy in the north at Ypres, and were making every effort to drive that attack home.  The probabilities were, therefore, that the line in front of the Arras-Loos position was none too strong, and that such reserves as could be spared had been sent north.  Then, again, it would tend to divert attention from the Ypres line, and so relieve somewhat the pressure on the British lines at that point.