The note admits, as most diplomatic documents do, of two interpretations.  They will be applied to it variously, as the reader is inclined to pessimism or to optimism.  It is a document in which lies the choice of war or peace evenly balanced.  I prefer to read into it all the optimism which can be derived from the knowledge that two nations, historically like-minded and bound to one another by strong ties of friendship, seldom go to war over matters which can be settled without resort to the arbitrament of arms.  There is no question outstanding today between the United States and Germany which cannot be settled through diplomatic channels.  I am inclined all the more to this optimism by the temperament and character of the President of the United for the time being.

I see in the note great possibilities for good.  The undersea activities of the German Navy in their effect upon the rights of the United States and its citizens form, properly, the burden of its argument.  We are addressing Germany, and it is only over her submarine policy that our interests have clashed with hers.  The note takes cognizance, however, of the inter-relation of Germany’s submarine policy and the British policy of “starving out Germany.”  The President has opened an avenue to the full discussion of the rights and obligations of submarines in naval warfare, and when Germany has stated her case it is not only not impossible but it is highly probable that he will be asked to suggest a modus vivendi by which the objectionable features of both these policies may be removed.

The situation is basically triangular and it is difficult to see how the settlement of our difficulties with Germany can escape involving at the same time the rectification of Great Britain’s methods of dealing with the trade between neutral countries and her adversaries.  It is but a step from the position of mediator in a question of this sort to that of mediator in the larger questions which make for war or peace.  I believe that the note contains the hopeful sign that these things may come to pass.

The possibilities are there and the President, I am confident, will overlook no possibility of advancing the cause of an early return of peace to Europe nor leave any unturned stone to free this country of the dangers and inconveniences which have become the concomitants of the European struggle.  Out of the troubled waters of our present relations with Germany may thus come a great and, we may hope, a lasting good.  Should this happily be the case, the wisdom of the President will have been confirmed and the thankfulness of the nation secured to him.  On the other hand, should his pacific hand be forced by those who wax fat and wealthy on strife and the end should be disaster untold to the country, he will still have the consolation of having fought a good battle and of knowing that he was worsted only by the irresistible force of demagogy in this country or abroad.