Fear that the British Government in its discussion of peace terms with Germany might defer to the policy of France and Russia of keeping important negotiations secret inspired the writing of this article, which appeared in The London Daily News of April 1, 1915, and is here published by the author’s permission.  Mr. Bennett points out that despite her alliance Great Britain is essentially a democracy subject to the mandates of her people.

The well-meant but ingenuous efforts of the Government to produce pessimism among the citizens have failed.  The object of these efforts was clear; it has, I think, been attained by more direct and wiser means.  Munitions of war are now being more satisfactorily manufactured, though the country still refuses to be gloomy.  “Eyewitness” pretended to quake, but Przemysl fell.  He tried again, but Sir John French announced that he did not believe in a protracted war.  Since Sir John French said also that he believed in victory, it follows that he believes in a victory not long delayed.  The incomparable and candid reports of the French War Office about the first stages of the war increased our confidence, and at the same time showed to us the inferiority of our own reports.  Only victors could publish such revelations, and Britain, with her passion for forgetting mistakes and her hatred of the confessional, could never bring herself to publish them.  These reports were confirmed and capped by the remarkable communications of General Joffre to a journalistic friend.  The New York Stock Exchange began to gamble about the date of victory.  The London Stock Exchange took on a new firmness.  Not even the sinister losses at Neuve Chapelle, nor the rumors concerning the same, could disturb our confidence.  Peace, therefore, in the general view, and certainty in the view of those who knew most, is decidedly nearer than when I wrote last about peace.

A short while ago Mr. Asquith referred with sarcasm and reproof to those who talk of peace.  But, for once, his meaning was not clear.  If he meant that to suggest peace to the enemy at this stage is both dangerous and ridiculous, he will be approved by the nation.  But if he meant that terms of peace must not even be mentioned among ourselves, he will find people ready to disagree with him, and to support the weight of his sarcasm and his reproof.  I am one of those people.  Bellicose by disposition, I nevertheless like to know what I am fighting for.  This is perhaps an idiosyncrasy, but many persons share it, and they are not to be ignored.  It may be argued that Mr. Asquith has defined what we are fighting for.  He has not.  He has only defined part of what we are fighting for.  His reference to the overthrow of Prussian militarism is futile, because it gives no indication of the method to be employed.  The method of liberating and compensating Belgium and other small communities is clear; but how are you to overthrow an ideal?  Prussian militarism will not be destroyed by a defeat in the field.  Militarism cannot overthrow militarism; it can only breed militarism.  The point is of the highest importance.