New York Times Current History; The European War, Vol 2, No. 3, June, 1915 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 441 pages of information about New York Times Current History; The European War, Vol 2, No. 3, June, 1915.

New York Times Current History; The European War, Vol 2, No. 3, June, 1915 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 441 pages of information about New York Times Current History; The European War, Vol 2, No. 3, June, 1915.

The treaty, as long as its intents and purposes had been loyally interpreted and regarded and as long as it had not been used as a pretext for aggression against others, greatly contributed to the elimination and settlement of causes of conflict, and for many years assured to Europe the inestimable benefits of peace.

But Austria-Hungary severed the treaty by her own hands.  She rejected the response of Serbia, which gave to her all the satisfaction she could legitimately claim.  She refused to listen to the conciliatory proposals presented by Italy in conjunction with other powers in the effort to spare Europe from a vast conflict certain to drench the Continent with blood and to reduce it to ruin beyond the conception of human imagination, and finally she provoked that conflict.

Article I. of the treaty embodied the usual and necessary obligation of such pacts—­the pledge to exchange views upon any fact and economic questions of a general nature that might arise pursuant to its terms.  None of the contracting parties had the right to undertake, without a previous agreement, any step the consequence of which might impose a duty upon the other signatories arising out of the Alliance, or which would in any way whatsoever encroach upon their vital interests.  This article was violated by Austria-Hungary when she sent to Serbia her note dated July 23, 1914, an action taken without the previous assent of Italy.

Thus, Austria-Hungary violated beyond doubt one of the fundamental provisions of the treaty.  The obligation of Austria-Hungary to come to a previous understanding with Italy was the greater because her obstinate policy against Serbia gave rise to a situation which directly tended to the provocation of a European war.

As far back as the beginning of July, 1914, the Italian Government, preoccupied by the prevailing feeling in Vienna, caused to be laid before the Austro-Hungarian Government a number of suggestions advising moderation, and warning it of the impending danger of a European outbreak.  The course adopted by Austria-Hungary against Serbia constituted, moreover, a direct encroachment upon the general interests of Italy, both political and economical, in the Balkan Peninsula.  Austria-Hungary could not for a moment imagine that Italy could remain indifferent while Serbian independence was being trodden upon.

On a number of occasions theretofore Italy gave Austria to understand, in friendly but clear terms, that the independence of Serbia was considered by Italy as essential to Balkan equilibrium.  Austria-Hungary was further advised that Italy could never permit that equilibrium to be disturbed to her prejudice.  This warning had been conveyed not only by her diplomats in private conversations with responsible Austro-Hungarian officials but was proclaimed publicly by Italian statesmen on the floors of Parliament.

Therefore when Austria-Hungary ignored the usual practices and menaced Serbia by sending her an ultimatum without in any way notifying the Italian Government of what she proposed to do, indeed leaving that Government to learn of her action through the press rather than through the usual channels of diplomacy, when Austria-Hungary took this unprecedented course she not only severed her alliance with Italy but committed an act inimical to Italy’s interests.

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New York Times Current History; The European War, Vol 2, No. 3, June, 1915 from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.