Today’s record of the brilliant feats of the Russian Army in the Carpathians during the past month, contained in the survey of the Grand Duke, presents only one aspect—­the discomfiture of the Austro-German forces.  The Neue Freie Presse gives some indication of the other aspect.

In a recent issue it stated that “the fortnight’s battle around the Lupkow and Uzsok Passes has been one of the most obstinate in history.  The Russians succeeded in forcing the Austrians out of their positions.  The difficulties of the Austro-Hungarian Army are complicated by the weather and the lack of ammunition and food.”  The question naturally suggests itself, why did these difficulties not equally disturb the Russian operations?  On our side the difficulties of transport were, if anything, greater.  The enemy was backed by numerous railways, with supplies close at hand, and was fighting on his native soil, and these advantages undoubtedly compensated for the greater difficulties of commissariat for the larger numbers of Austro-Germans.  But from the avowal of the Neue Freie Presse it is suggested here that the Austrians were disorganized.  The causes of this disorganization are attributed by military observers to the mixing up of German with Austrian units, rendering the task of command and supply very difficult.

The Grand Duke is fully prepared to take the field as soon as the allied commanders decide that the time for a general action has come.  Never has the spirit of the Russian Army been firmer.

The critics this morning comment on the official communique detailing a gigantic task brilliantly fulfilled by the Carpathian army during March.  Our position in the region of the Dukla Pass early last month exposed us to pressure from two sides, and might have involved the necessity of evacuating the main range.  Our army thus required to extend its positions commanding the outlets to the Hungarian plain, before the Spring thaws, in face of a large hostile concentration between Lupkow and Uzsok.  The chief attack was directed against the latter section, and an auxiliary attack against the Bartfeld-Lupkow section.  The auxiliary attack began on March 19 against the Austro-German left flank and reached its full development four days later.  Mistaking the auxiliary for the principal attack, the enemy began an advance from the Bukowina, hoping to divert us from Uzsok, but, instead, the larger portion of our army assailed the enemy’s flanks while a smaller body advanced against Rostoki, surmounting the immense difficulties of mountain warfare in Springtime.

By means of the envelopment of both his flanks the enemy was, by April 5, dislodged from the main range on the entire seventy-mile front from Regetow to Wolosate.  Convinced that we were directing our chief efforts against his flanks, the enemy now strove to break our resistance in the Rostoki direction, but, after sixteen futile attacks, he was obliged to cede the commanding height of Telepovce, our occupation of which will probably compel him to evacuate his positions at Polen and Smolnik and withdraw to the valley of the Cziroka, a tributary of the Laborez.