During this time our artillery completely cut off the village and surrounding country from any German reinforcements which could be thrown into the fight to restore the situation, by means of a curtain of shrapnel fire.  Prisoners subsequently reported that all attempts at reinforcing the front line were checked.  Steps were at once taken to consolidate the positions won.

Considerable delay occurred after the capture of the Neuve Chapelle position.  The infantry was greatly disorganized by the violent nature of the attack and by its passage through the enemy’s trenches and the buildings of the village.  It was necessary to get the units to some extent together before pushing on.  The telephonic communication being cut by the enemy’s fire rendered communication between the front and the rear most difficult.  The fact of the left of the Twenty-third Brigade having been held up had kept back the Eighth Division and had involved a portion of the Twenty-fifth Brigade in fighting to the north, out of its proper direction of advance.  All this required adjustment.  An orchard held by the enemy north of Neuve Chapelle also threatened the flank of an advance toward the Aubers Bridge.

I am of the opinion that this delay would not have occurred had the clearly expressed order of the general officer commanding the First Army been carefully observed.

The difficulties above enumerated might have been overcome earlier in the day if the general officer commanding the Fourth Corps had been able to bring his reserve brigades more speedily into action.  As it was, a further advance did not commence before 3:30 o’clock.  The Twenty-first Brigade was able to form up in the open on the left without a shot being fired at it, thus showing that, at the time, the enemy’s resistance had been paralyzed.

The brigade pushed forward in the direction of Moulin-du-Pietre.  At first it made good progress, but was subsequently held up by machine gun fire from houses and from a defended work in the line of the German intrenchments opposite the right of the Twenty-second Brigade.

Further to the south the Twenty-fourth Brigade, which had been directed on Pietre, was similarly held up by machine guns in houses and trenches.  At the road junction, 600 yards to the northwest of Pietre, the Twenty-fifth Brigade, on the right of the Twenty-fourth, was also held up by machine guns from a bridge held by the Germans over the River Les Layes, which is situated to the northwest of the Bois du Biez.

While two brigades of the Meerut Division were establishing themselves on a new line the Dehra Dun Brigade, supported by the Jullunder Brigade of the Lahore Division, moved to the attack of the Bois du Biez, but were held up on the line of the River Les Layes by a German post at the bridge, which enfiladed them and brought them to a standstill.

The defended bridge over the Les Layes and its neighborhood immediately assumed considerable importance.  While the artillery fire was brought to bear, as far as circumstances would permit, on this point, General Sir Douglas Haig directed the First Corps to dispatch one or more battalions of the First Brigade in support of the troops attacking the bridge.  Three battalions were thus sent to Richebourg St. Vaast.