By Edward W. Thomson, F.R.S.L., F.R.S.C.

[From THE NEW YORK TIMES, April, 1915.]

Canada’s political relation to Great Britain, and, indeed, to all other countries, has been essentially altered by Canada’s quite voluntary engagement in the war.  Were feudal terms not largely inapplicable, one might aver that the vassal has become the suzerain’s ally, political equality connoted.

But, indeed, Canadians were never vassals.  They have ever been Britons, whatever their individual origins, retaining the liberties of their political birthright.  While in a certain tutelage to their own monarchs’ immediate Ministries, they have continually, slowly, consciously, expanded their freedom from such tutelage, substituting for it self-government or rule by their own representatives, without forsaking but rather enhancing their allegiance to the common Crown.  This has long been the symbol of their self-government, even as it is to old country kinsmen the symbol of rule by themselves.

The alteration manifested by Canada’s active, voluntary engagement in the European war is the change from Canadians holding, as they formerly did, that Great Britain was bound to defend Canada, while Canadians were not bound to defend Great Britain outside Canada.  The “dependency” has not been now dragged in; it acted as an independency; it recognized its participation with Great Britain in a common danger; it proceeded quite voluntarily, quite independently, to recruit, organize, dispatch, and maintain large forces for the common cause.  Canada’s course has become that of a partner in respect of acceptance of risks and of contribution to expenses.

This partner has no formally specified share in gains, or in authority, or in future policy of the concern.  Canada has no obvious, distinct, admitted way or voice as to the conduct of war or making of peace.  She appears, with the other self-governing Dominions of the Crown, as an ally having no vote in settlements, none of the prerogatives of an ally.  Hence some observers in Great Britain, in Canada, in other realms of the Crown contend that the old, expressed relations between Great Britain, Canada, and the other Dominions must inevitably be extensively changed formally as well as actually in consequence of the war.

Some say imperial federation cannot but ensue.  Others argue that formal independence must arrive if such federation come not speedily.  Others contend for an Empire League of sister States.  Nobody ventures to mention what was often talked publicly by Canadians from thirty to fifty years ago, and later by Goldwin Smith, viz., Canada’s entrance to the United States as a new tier of sovereign States.  The idea of severance from Great Britain has vanished.  Discussion of the other alternatives is not inactive, but it is forced.  It engages the quidnuncs.  They are talkers who must say something for the delight of hearing themselves; or they are writers who live under the exigency of needing to get “something different” daily into print.  They are mostly either “Jingoes” or Centralizationists, as contra to Nationalists or Decentralizationists, long-standing opponents.