The assumption underlying the whole theory of the balance of power is that predominant military power in a nation will necessarily—­or at least probably—­be exercised against its weaker neighbors to their disadvantage.  Thus Britain has acted on the assumption that if one power dominated the Continent, British independence, more truly perhaps British predominance in the world would be threatened.

Now, how has a society of individuals—­the community within the frontiers of a nation—­met this difficulty which now confronts the society of nations, the difficulty that is of the danger of the power of an individual or a group?  They have met it by determining that no individual or group shall exercise physical power or predominance over others; that the community alone shall be predominant.  How has that predominance been secured?  By determining that any one member attacked shall be opposed by the whole weight of the community, (exercised, say, through the policeman.) If A flies at B’s throat in the street with the evident intention of throttling him to death, the community, if it is efficient, immediately comes to the support of B.

And you will note this:  that it does not allow force to be used for the settlement of differences by anybody.  The community does not use force as such at all; it merely cancels the force of units and determines that nobody shall use it.  It eliminates force.  And it thus cancels the power of the units to use it against other units (other than as a part of the community) by standing ready at all times to reduce the power of any one unit to futility.  If A says that B began it, the community does not say, “Oh, in that case you may continue to use your force; finish him off.”  It says, on the contrary, “Then we’ll see that B does not use his force; we’ll restrain him, we won’t have either of you using force.  We’ll cancel it and suppress it wherever it rears its head.”  For there is this paradox at the basis of all civilized intercourse:  force between men has but one use—­to see that force settles no difference between them.

And this has taken place because men—­individually—­have decided that the advantage of the security of each from aggression outweighs the advantage which each has in the possible exercise of aggression.  When nations have come to the same decision—­and not a moment before—­they will protect themselves from aggression in precisely the same way—­by agreeing between them that they will cancel by their collective power the force of any one member exercised against another.

I emphasize the fact that you must get this recognition of common interest in a given action before you can get the common action.  We have managed it in the relations between individuals because, the numbers being so much greater than in the case of nations, individual dissent goes for less.  The policeman, the judge, the jailer have behind them a larger number relatively to individual exceptions than is the case with nations.  For the existence of such an arrangement by no means implies that men shall be perfect, that each shall willingly obey all the laws which he enforces.  It merely implies that his interest in the law as a whole is greater than his interest in its general violation.