All this, of course, is no argument for departing from our traditional isolation.  Our entrance into the welter might not change things or it might change them for the worse or the disadvantages might be such as to outweigh the advantages.  The sensible question for America is this:  “Can we affect the general course of events in Europe—­in the world, that is—­to our advantage by entering in; and will the advantage of so doing be of such extent as to offset the risks and costs?”

Before answering that question I want to indicate by very definite proposals or propositions a course of action and a basis for estimating the effect.  I will put the proposal with reference to America’s future attitude to Europe in the form of a definite proposition thus: 

That America shall use her influence to secure the abandonment by the powers of Christendom of rival group alliances and the creation instead of an alliance of all the civilized powers having as its aim some common action—­not necessarily military—­which will constitute a collective guarantee of each against aggression.

Thus when Germany, asked by the Allies at the prospective peace to remove the menace of her militarism by reducing her armaments, replies, “What of my protection against Russia?” Christendom should, with America’s help, be in a position to reply:  “We will all protect you against Russia, just as we would all protect Russia against you.”

The considerations which support such a policy on America’s part are mainly these:  First, that if America does not lend the assistance of her detachment from European quarrels to such an arrangement, Europe of herself may not prove capable of it.  Second, that if Europe does not come to some such arrangement the resulting unrest, militarism, moral and material degeneration, for the reasons above indicated and for others to be indicated presently, will most unfavorably affect the development of America, and expose her to dangers internal and external much greater than those which she would incur by intervention.  Third, that if America’s influence is in the manner indicated made the deciding factor in the establishment of a new form of world society, she would virtually take the leadership of Western civilization, and her capital become the centre of the political organization of the new world State.  While “world domination” by military means has always proved a dangerous diet for all nations that have eaten of it heretofore, the American form of that ambition would have this great difference from earlier forms—­that it would be welcomed instead of being resisted by the dominated.  America would have given a new meaning to the term and found a means of satisfying national pride, certainly more beneficial than that which comes of military glory.

I envisage the whole problem, however, first and last in this discussion on the basis of America’s interest; and the test which I would apply to the alternatives now presenting themselves is simply this:  What on balance is most advantageous, in the broadest and largest sense of the term, in its moral as well as its material sense, to American interest?