order, not far-fetched in respect of sense, corrected with one another as cause and effect and each having a specific object.[1694] I shall not tell thee anything, prompted by desire or wrath or fear or cupidity or abjectness or deceit or shame or compassion or pride. (I answer thee because it is proper for me to answer what thou hast said).  When the speaker, the hearer, and the words said, thoroughly agree with one another in course of a speech, then does the sense or meaning come out very clearly.  When, in the matter of what is to be said, the speaker shows disregard for the understanding of the hearer by uttering words whose meaning is understood by himself, then, however good those words may be, they become incapable of being seized by the hearer.[1695] That speaker, again, who, abandoning all regard for his own meaning uses words that are of excellent sound and sense, awakens only erroneous, impressions in the mind of the hearer.  Such words in such connection become certainly faulty.  That speaker, however, who employs words that are, while expressing his own meaning, intelligible to the hearer, as well, truly deserves to be called a speaker.  No other man deserves the name.  It behoveth thee, therefore, O king, to hear with concentrated attention these words of mine, fraught with meaning and endued with wealth of vocables.  Thou hast asked me who I am, whose I am, whence I am coming, etc.  Listen to me, O king, with undivided mind, as I answer these questions of thine.  As lac and wood, as grains of dust and drops of water, exist commingled when brought together, even so are the existences of all creatures.[1696] Sound, touch, taste, form, and scent, these and the senses, though diverse in respect of their essences, exist yet in a state of commingling like lac and wood.  It is again well known that nobody asks any of these, saying, who art thou?  Each of them also has no knowledge either of itself or of the others.  The eye cannot see itself.  The ear cannot hear itself.  The eye, again, cannot discharge the functions of any of the other senses, nor can any of the senses discharge the functions of any sense save its own.  If all of them even combine together, even they fail to know their own selves as dust and water mingled together cannot know each other though existing in a state of union.  In order to discharge their respective functions, they await the contact of objects that are external to them.  The eye, form, and light, constitute the three requisites of the operation called seeing.  The same, as in this case, happens in respect of the operations of the other senses and the ideas which is their result.  Then, again, between the functions of the senses (called vision, hearing, etc.,) and the ideas which are their result (viz., form, sound, etc.), the mind is an entity other than the senses And is regarded to have an action of its own.  With its help one distinguishes what is existent from what is non-existent for arriving at certainty (in the matter of all ideas