We have proceeded on the assumption that the Irish Parliament would—­formally, at least—­confine itself within the limits prescribed by the law of its creation.  But it is necessary at least to contemplate the possibility that it would prove less complaisant.  The safeguards and limitations inserted in any Act of the kind must of necessity be couched in general terms.  The constitutional history of the United States and other countries is full of cases showing how difficult it is to define in practice where the border line between intra and ultra vires comes.  It is the custom of all Governments, if there is any possible room for debate as to their competence to take any particular line of action, to give themselves the fullest benefit of the doubt, and the Irish Government is unlikely to prove any exception to the rule.  When the Judicature and all the forces of Executive Government, except the direct command of troops, is in their hands, the laws passed by the Irish Parliament could be put in force in Ireland.  The British Government could not intervene except by acts which would amount to open war between the two countries.  We must remember that this enforcement of Irish laws by Irish police in spite of the decisions of a “foreign” Government at Westminster is openly advocated and contemplated by the large and active section of the Nationalists who have adopted as their watchword the motto “Ourselves alone” (Sinn Fein).  Nothing could be more futile than the idea that the judgments of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council would ever be accepted as final by the Nationalist majority, or that the royal assent could ever be withheld from an Act constitutionally passed by the Irish Legislature, without precipitating a crisis.  The result of applying the veto of the House of Lords in England to the measures of Liberal Ministers was the agitation for removing the veto.  The Nationalists took part in that agitation and have learned its lesson.  Directly the British Government asserts its technical right of veto, a similar agitation to get rid of all obnoxious restraints would arise in Ireland.

If anything could increase the danger of friction, it would be the scheme favoured by Mr. Erskine Childers and other Liberals of submitting constitutional questions to the decision of the British Privy Council reinforced by Irish judges.  Either these judges would concur in verdicts given against the pretensions of the Irish Parliament or they would not.  If they did concur, there would be a fierce outcry against the right of judges appointed under the Union Government to nullify Acts of the Irish Legislature.  But if they did not concur, the patriotic indignation with which a decision over the heads of the Irish representatives would be received is easy to foresee.  It would be a matter of the greatest difficulty to enforce any such decision when the Irish Government, supported by an agitation in the country, refused to be bound