In a federation every citizen, in whatever state or province he resides, is as fully a citizen of the federation as every other citizen.  He not only has the same federal vote, and pays the same federal taxes, but he has the same access to the federal courts, and the same right to the direct protection of the federal executive.  In what sense are any of these conditions likely to be true of, let us say, an Irish landlord under this Home Rule Bill?  Again, federalism implies that all the subordinate units are in an equal position relatively to the federal authority.  Is this Bill likely to be so framed that its provisions can be adapted unchanged to Scotland, Wales, or England?  And if they could, what sort of a residuum of a United Kingdom government would be left over?  Take finance alone:  if every unit under “Home Rule all round” is to receive the whole product of its taxation, what becomes of the revenue on which the general government of the United Kingdom will have to subsist?  The fact is that the creation of a federal state, whether by confederation or by devolution of powers, must be, in the main, a simultaneous act.  Additional subordinate units may subsequently join the confederation under the conditions of the federal constitution.  Backward areas which are unable to provide for an efficient provincial expenditure, over and above their contribution to federal expenditure, may be held back as territories directly controlled by the federal authorities till they are financially and in other respects ripe for the grant of provincial powers.  If a federal scheme were really seriously contemplated by the present Government they would have to adopt one of two courses.  They would either have to establish it simultaneously for the whole United Kingdom, and in that case limit the powers and functions of the provinces so narrowly as to make it possible for Ireland to raise its provincial revenue without undue difficulty, the rest of Ireland’s needs being met by a substantial federal expenditure carried out by federal officials.  Or else they might begin by the creation of a federal constitution with considerable provincial powers for England, Scotland, and Wales, keeping back Ireland as a federal territory till its economic and social conditions justified the establishment of provincial institutions.  The converse policy of treating the case of Ireland as “prior in point of time and urgency,"[58] of giving the poorest and most backward portion of the United Kingdom the whole of its revenue and a practically unfettered control of its territory, is, indeed, “not merely non-federal, but anti-federal.”