In the first place, it is not immaterial to observe that each of the Legislatures here referred to resulted, not from the dissolution of an existing union, but from the voluntary assumption by communities formerly independent of one another of a closer bond.  In other words, there was in each case a real Jaedus or treaty, not imposed by the Imperial power, but having a local origin and springing from the need of common action.  The operative force was centripetal; and as the force continues to operate, the tendency of the mass is towards a chemical in lieu of a mechanical fusion.[49] But in the case of the United Kingdom a change from organic union to Federation would be the beginning of dissolution; and the centrifugal force, once set in motion, might lead further in the same direction.

Again, there can be no true federation without (1) provincial legislatures and executives, (2) a central Parliament and executive, (3) a careful definition of the powers of each, and (4) a federal court to which should be entrusted the duty of determining questions arising between the federal and provincial governments and legislatures.  If, therefore, provincial or state Governments are created for Ireland and for Scotland, a like Government should logically be created for England.  Are we prepared to see four (or, if Wales be added, five) legislatures, and four (or five) executives, in these islands?  Have we considered the possible effect on our whole system of government, on the theory of Cabinet responsibility to Parliament, on the powers of the House of Commons over grievance and supply?  Must not each unit in a Federation be put as regards financial matters upon a like footing; and, if so, can Ireland bear her share?  Is federation consistent with the predominance of one state, England, in wealth and population?  These questions are vital, and none of them have received consideration.  By declaring in general terms for Federalism you go but a little way.

And if we treat the proposal for Federation as indicating a desire to adopt a constitution under which the relations of the United Kingdom to each of its constituent parts would be as the relation of some one of the three self-governing Dominions to the states or provinces of which it is composed, the question remains, which of those Dominions should be adopted as a model?  For they differ not only in form but in essence.

Under the British North America Act, 1867, and the amending statutes, there is “one Parliament for Canada” (sect. 17), while each province has its Legislature.  Each provincial Legislature is empowered exclusively to make laws in relation to certain specified subjects (including property and civil rights and the administration of justice), and also in relation to “all matters of a merely local or private nature in the province”; while the Dominion Parliament may “make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Canada in relation to all matters not coming within” the classes of subjects assigned exclusively to the provincial Legislatures.  The division of functions has given rise to much confusion and litigation; but, speaking generally, the trend of judicial decision has been towards a wide interpretation of the provincial powers.  The “residuary powers” are in the Dominion Parliament.