About 245,000 Territorials. 72,000 of these are under 20.

In all there are some 400,000 men, of whom 130,000 are boys and 60,000 will leave the country soon after war breaks out.  This will leave some 210,000 men to provide for the defence of England, Scotland, and Ireland, supplemented by 130,000 boys.  These troops will be deprived of practically all Regular and even Reserve officers, and will have to provide for coast defence, for the security of law and order, and for the numbers required for a central field force.  By means of juggling with figures, by the registration of names in what is called the National Reserve, but has no organisation or corporate existence, and by similar means, the seriousness of this situation has been concealed to some extent, but it is generally recognised as being little short of a national scandal, and would not be tolerated were it not for the general ignorance of our people concerning the exigencies of war and their blind belief in the omnipotence of the navy.  This defencelessness has two dangers:  firstly, the chance of a successful raid or invasion.  As long as our navy is not defeated, no invading force of more than 70,000 men is supposed to be capable of landing.  The second danger is that the mere fear of such an event will prevent the despatch of the Expeditionary Force and the fulfilment of our oversea obligations.

It must be obvious that in the precarious state of our national defence anything which renders either of these dangers more probable should be avoided at all costs.  If, for instance, the condition of Ireland should demand the maintenance of a larger garrison in that country, the whole of our present organisation for defence falls to pieces.  Looking only at the present foreign situation, and the ever-growing menace of increasing armaments, if the passing of Home Rule should require the retention of a single extra soldier in Ireland, it is perfectly certain that nothing could justify the adoption of such a measure.  It is not intended to convey the impression that there is any fear of Ireland repeating the history of 1796 and welcoming a foreign invasion, although it is impossible to ignore the anti-English campaign of agitation, or to say to what length it will go; but the mere fact of internal dissension in that country will give an enemy exactly the chance he looks for.  Many of those best qualified to judge are of opinion that Germany is only waiting to free herself of an embarrassing situation, until one power of the Triple Entente is for the time being too much occupied to intervene in a Continental struggle.  We have had one warning when, in September, 1911, a railway strike at home coincided with a foreign crisis.  Are we deliberately to take a step which will almost certainly involve us in a similar dilemma?