After the wars in Sicily, carried on by the Angevine princes, had ceased (1302), a body of disbanded soldiers, chiefly foreigners, was formed under Fra Ruggieri, a Templar, and swept the South of Italy.  Giovanni Villani marks this as the first sign of the scourge which was destined to prove so fatal to the peace of Italy.[1] But it was not any merely accidental outbreak of Banditti, such as this, which established the Condottiere system.  The causes were far more deeply seated, in the nature of Italian despotism and in the peculiar requirements of the republics.  We have already seen how Frederick II. found it convenient to employ Saracens in his warfare with the Holy See.  The same desire to procure troops incapable of sympathizing with the native population induced the Scala and Visconti tyrants to hire German, Breton, Swiss, English, and even Hungarian guards.  These foreign troops remained at the disposal of the tyrants and superseded the national militia.  The people of Italy were reserved for taxation; the foreigners carried on the wars of the princes.  Nor was this policy otherwise than popular.  It relieved all classes from the conscription, leaving the burgher free to ply his trade, the peasant to till his fields, and disarming the nobles who were still rebellious and turbulent within the city walls.  The same custom gained ground among the Republics.  Rich Florentine citizens preferred to stay at home at ease, or to travel abroad for commerce, while they intrusted their military operations to paid generals.[2] Venice, jealous of her own citizens, raised no levies in her immediate territory, and made a rule of never confiding her armies to Venetians.  Her admirals, indeed, were selected from the great families of the Lagoons.  But her troops were placed beneath the discipline of foreigners.  The warfare of the Church, again, had of necessity to be conducted on the same principles; for it did not often happen that a Pope arose like Julius II., rejoicing in the sound of cannon and the life of camps.  In this way principalities and republics gradually denationalized their armies, and came to carrying on campaigns by the aid of foreign mercenaries under paid commanders.  The generals, wishing as far as possible to render their troops movable and compact, suppressed the infantry, and confined their attention to perfecting the cavalry.  Heavy-armed cavaliers, officered by professional captains, fought the battles of Italy; while despots and republics schemed in their castles, or debated in their council-chambers, concerning objects of warfare about which the soldiers of fortune were indifferent.  The pay received by men-at-arms was more considerable than that of the most skilled laborers in any peaceful trade.  The perils of military service in Italy, conducted on the most artificial principles, were but slight; while the opportunities of self-indulgence—­of pillage during war and of pleasure in the brief intervals of peace—­attracted all the hot blood of the country to this service.[3] Therefore, in course of time, the profession of Condottiere fascinated the needier nobility of Italy, and the ranks of their men-at-arms were recruited by townsfolk and peasants, who deliberately chose a life of adventure.