While Charles was amusing himself at Naples, a storm was gathering in his rear.  A league against him had been formed in April by the great powers of Europe.  Venice, alarmed for the independence of Italy, and urged by the Sultan, who had reason to dread Charles VIII.,[1] headed the league.  Lodovico, now that he had attained his selfish object in the quiet position of Milan, was anxious for his safety.  The Pope still feared a general council.  Maximilian, who could not forget the slight put upon him in the matter of his daughter and his bride, was willing to co-operate against his rival.  Ferdinand and Isabella, having secured themselves in Roussillon, thought it behooved them to re-establish Spaniards of their kith and kin in Naples.  Each of the contracting parties had his role assigned to him.  Spain undertook to aid Ferdinand of Aragon in Calabria.  Venice was to attack the seaports of the kingdom; Lodovico Sforza, to occupy Asti; the King of the Romans, to make a diversion in the North.  Florence alone, though deeply injured by Charles in the matter of Pisa, kept faith with the French.

[1] Charles, by an act dated A.D. 1494, September 6, had bought the title of Emperor of Constantinople and Trebizond from Andrew Palaeologus (see Gibbon, vol. viii. p. 183, ed.  Milman).  When he took Djem from Alexander in Rome, his object was to make use of him in a war against Bajazet; and the Pope was always impressing on the Turk the peril of a Frankish crusade.

The danger was imminent.  Already Ferdinand the Catholic had disembarked troops on the shore of Sicily, and was ready to throw an army into the ports of Reggio and Tropea.  Alexander had refused to carry out his treaty by the surrender of Spoleto.  Cesare Borgia had escaped from the French camp.  The Lombards were menacing Asti, which the Duke of Orleans held, and without the possession of which there was no safe return to France.  Asti indeed at this juncture would have fallen, and Charles would have been caught in a trap, if the Venetians had only been quick or wary enough to engage German mercenaries.[1] The danger of the situation may best be judged by reading the Memoirs of De Comines, who was then ambassador at Venice.  ’The league was concluded very late one evening.  The next morning the Signory sent for me earlier than usual.  They were assembled in great numbers, perhaps a hundred or more, and held their heads high, made a good cheer, and had not the same countenance as on the day when they told me of the capture of the citadel of Naples.[2] My heart was heavy, and I had grave doubts about the person of the king and about all his company; and I thought their scheme more ripe than it really was, and feared they might have Germans ready; and if it had been so, never could the king have got safe out of Italy.’  Nevertheless De Comines put a brave face on the matter, and told the council that he had already received information of the league and had sent dispatches