depended upon mercenary arms.’[1] Here he touches the real weakness of the Italian states.  Then he proceeds to explain further the rottenness of the Condottiere system.  Captains of adventure are either men of ability or not.  If they are, you have to fear lest their ambition prompt them to turn their arms against yourself or your allies.  This happened to Queen Joan of Naples, who was deserted by Sforza Attendolo in her sorest need; to the Milanese, when Francesco Sforza made himself their despot; to the Venetians, who were driven to decapitate Carmagnuola because they feared him.  The only reason why the Florentines were not enslaved by Sir John Hawkwood was that, though an able general, he achieved no great successes in the field.  In the same way they escaped by luck from Sforza, who turned his attention to Milan, and from Braccio, who formed designs against the Church and Naples.  If Paolo Vitelli had been victorious against Pisa (1498), he would have held them at discretion.  In each of these cases it was only the good fortune of the republic which saved it from a military despotism.  If, on the other hand, the mercenary captains are men of no capacity, you are defeated in the field.

    [1] See chapter xii. of the Principe.

Proceeding to the historical development of this bad system, Machiavelli points out how after the decline of the Imperial authority in Italy, the Papacy and the republics got the upper hand.  Priests and merchants were alike unwilling to engage in war.  Therefore they took mercenary troops into their pay.  The companies of the Sforzeschi and Bracceschi were formed; and ’after these came all those others who have ruled this sort of warfare down to our own days.  The consequence of their valor is that Italy has been harried by Charles, plundered by Louis, forced by Ferdinand, insulted by the Swiss.  Their method has been to enhance the reputation of their cavalry by depressing the infantry.  Being without dominion of their own, and making war their commerce, a few foot soldiers brought them no repute, while they were unable to support many.  Therefore they confined themselves to cavalry, until in a force of 20,000 men you could not number 2,000 infantry.  Besides this they employed all their ingenuity to relieve themselves and their soldiers of fatigue and peril, by refraining from slaughter and from taking prisoners without ransom.  Night attacks and sorties were abandoned; stockades and trenches in the camp were given up; no one thought of a winter campaign.  All these things were allowed, or rather introduced, in order to avoid, as I have said, fatigue and peril.  Whereby they have reduced Italy to slavery and insult.’  Auxiliaries, such as the French troops borrowed by Cesare Borgia, and the Spaniards engaged by Julius II., are even worse.  ’He who wants to be unable to win the game should make use of these forces; for they are far more dangerous than mercenaries, seeing that in them the cause of ruin is ready made—­they