that the Orsini through the mediation of Paolo became his friends again.’  The cruelty of Cesare Borgia was only equalled by his craft; and it was by a supreme exercise of his power of fascination that he lured the foes who had plotted against him at La Magione into his snare at Sinigaglia.  Paolo Orsini, Francesco Orsini, duke of Gravina, Vitellozzo Vitelli, and Oliverotto da Fermo were all men of arms, accustomed to intrigue and to bloodshed, and more than one of them were stained with crimes of the most atrocious treachery.  Yet such were the arts of Cesare Borgia that in 1502 he managed to assemble them, apart from their troops, in the castle of Sinigaglia, where he had them strangled.  Having now destroyed the chiefs of the opposition and enlisted their forces in his own service, Cesare, to use the phrase of Machiavelli, ‘had laid good foundations for his future power.’  He commanded a sufficient territory; he wielded the temporal and spiritual power of his father; he was feared by the princes and respected by the people throughout Italy; his cruelty and perfidy and subtlety and boldness caused him to be universally admired.  But as yet he had only laid foundations.  The empire of Italy was still to win; for he aspired to nothing else, and it is even probable that he entertained a notion of secularizing the Papacy.  France was the chief obstacle to his ambition.  The alarm of Louis had at last been roused.  But Louis’ own mistake in bringing the Spaniards into Naples afforded Cesare the means of shaking off the French control.  He espoused the cause of Spain, and by intriguing now with the one power and now with the other made himself both formidable and desirable to each.  His geographical position between Milan and Naples enforced this policy.  Another difficulty against which he had to provide was in the future rather than the present.  Should his father die, and a new Pope adverse to his interests be elected, he might lose not only the support of the Holy See, but also his fiefs of Romagna and Urbino.  To meet this contingency he took four precautions, mentioned with great admiration by Machiavelli.  In the first place he systematically murdered the heirs of the ruling families of all the cities he acquired—­as for example three Varani at Camerino, two Manfredi at Faenza, the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigaglia, and others whom it would be tedious to mention.  By this process he left no scion of the ancient houses for a future Pope to restore.  In the second place he attached to his person by pensions, offices, and emoluments, all the Roman gentry, so that he might be able to keep the new Pope a prisoner and unarmed in Rome.  Thirdly, he reduced the College of Cardinals, by bribery, terrorism, poisoning, and packed elections, to such a state that he could count on the creation of a Pope, if not his nominee, at least not hostile to his interests.  Fourthly, he lost no time, but pushed his plans of conquest on with utmost speed, so as, if possible, to command a large territory at