doctrine and to the example of Venice [see Segni, p. 15, and compare the speeches of Pagolo Antonio Soderini and Guido Antonio Vespucci, in Guicciardini’s Istoria d’ Italia, vol. ii. p. 155 of Rosini’s edition, on the same occasion].  Segni, p. 86, mentions a speech of Pier Filippo Pandolfini, the arguments of which, he says, were drawn from Aristotle and illustrated by Florentine history.  The Italian doctrinaires seem to have imagined that, by clever manipulation of existing institutions, they could construct a state similar to that called [Greek:  politeia] by Aristotle, in which all sections of the community should be fairly represented.  Venice, meanwhile, was a practical instance of the possible prosperity of such a constitution with a strong oligarchical complexion.

[5] These numbers, 100,000 for the population, and 5,000 for the burghers, are stated roundly.  In Florence, when the Consiglio Maggiore was opened in 1495, it was found that the Florentines altogether numbered about 90,000, while the qualified burghers were not more than 3,200.  In 1581 the population of Venice numbered 134,890, whereof 1,843 were adult patricians [see below, p. 209].

Intolerant of foreign rule, and blinded by the theoretical supremacy of the Empire to the need of looking beyond its own municipal institutions, each city in the twelfth century sought to introduce such a system into the already existing machinery of the burgh as should secure its independence and place the government in the hands of its citizens.  But the passing of bad laws, or the non-observance of wise regulations, or, again, the passions of individuals and parties, soon disturbed the equilibrium established in these little communities.  Desire for more power than their due prompted one section of the burghers to violence.  The love of independence, or simple insubordination, drove another portion to resistance.  Matters were further complicated by resident or neighboring nobles.  Then followed the wars of factions, proscriptions, and exiles.  Having banished their rivals, the party in power for the time being remodeled the institutions of the republic to suit their own particular interest.  Meanwhile the opposition in exile fomented every element of discontent within the city, which this short-sighted policy was sure to foster.  Sudden revolutions were the result, attended in most cases by massacres consequent upon the victorious return of the outlaws.  To the action of these peccant humors—­umori is the word applied by the elder Florentine historians to the troubles attendant upon factions—­must be added the jealousy of neighboring cities, the cupidity of intriguing princes, the partisanship of the Guelfs and Ghibellines, the treason and the egotism of mercenary generals, and the false foreign policy which led the Italians to rely for aid on France or Germany or Spain.  Little by little, under the prolonged action of these disturbing forces, each republic in turn became weaker,