OF ILLINOIS. (BORN 1809, DIED 1865.)

On the Dred Scott decision,

Springfield, Illinois, June 26, 1857.

And now as to the Dred Scott decision.  That decision declares two propositions—­first, that a negro cannot sue in the United States courts; and secondly, that Congress cannot prohibit slavery in the Territories.  It was made by a divided court—­dividing differently on the different points.  Judge Douglas does not discuss the merits of the decision, and in that respect I shall follow his example, believing I could no more improve on McLean and Curtis than he could on Taney.

He denounces all who question the correctness of that decision, as offering violent resistance to it.  But who resists it?  Who has, in spite of the decision, declared Dred Scott free, and resisted the authority of his master over him?

Judicial decisions have two uses,—­first, to absolutely determine the case decided; and secondly, to indicate to the public how other similar cases will be decided when they arise.  For the latter use they are called “precedents” and “authorities.”

We believe as much as Judge Douglas (perhaps more) in obedience to, and respect for, the judicial department of government.  We think its decisions on constitutional questions, when fully settled, should control not only the particular cases decided, but the general policy of the country, subject to be disturbed only by amendments to the Constitution as provided in that instrument itself.  More than this would be revolution.  But we think the Dred Scott decision is erroneous.  We know the court that made it has often overruled its own decisions, and we shall do what we can to have it to overrule this.  We offer no resistance to it.

Judicial decisions are of greater or less authority as precedents according to circumstances.  That this should be so accords both with common sense and the customary understanding of the legal profession.

If this important decision had been made by the unanimous concurrence of the judges, and without any apparent partisan bias, and in accordance with legal public expectation and with the steady practice of the departments throughout our history, and had been in no part based on assumed historical facts which are not really true; or, if wanting in some of these, it had been before the court more than once, and had there been affirmed and reaffirmed through a course of years, it then might be, perhaps would be, factious, nay, even revolutionary, not to acquiesce in it as a precedent.

But when, as is true, we find it wanting in all these claims to the public confidence, it is not factious, it is not even disrespectful, to treat it as not having yet quite established a settled doctrine for the country.  But Judge Douglas considers this view awful.  Hear him: